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 This work traces the transformation of official political discourse in Egypt 
between 1971 and 1981 through official statements and written texts. Performative 
practices are also analyzed as locuters of discourse. Discursive shifts concern such topics 
as Israel, Zionism and Imperialism; state and governance; and society. Counter-discourse 
of radical Islamists is also analyzed through the similar lens of texts and practices. 
Similarities and contradictions between these two discourses regarding various aspects 
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Language shapes the way we think, 
And determines what we can think about it. 
Benjamin Lee Whorf 
 
The overarching concern of this research is the interaction between language and 
conflict. It seeks to unpack the complex interrelationship between political discourse and 
political action. Discourse, closely analyzed by Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Lacan and Jürgen Habermas, is a complex notion, which 
is now widely used in the fields of humanities and social sciences. In the works of Michel 
Foucault, discourse is referred to as “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge 
and social practices” 1  and as an “entity of sequences of signs in that they are 
enouncements,”2 that is, statements. In this study discourse is defined as a set of written 
and spoken texts, understood as a form of social practice and determined by social 
structures.3 Counter-discourse is understood as a discourse formed in response to the 
dominant “story.” It addresses and challenges the cognitive and axio-systems created and 
promoted by the official narrative.    
The study of the hegemonic discourse produced by political elites, and of the 
counter-narratives created by different political actors, sheds light on multiple themes. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 3. 
2 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 141. 
3 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (New York: Longman,1992), 17. 
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First, rhetoric reflects political culture and the values that inform and sustain conflictual 
situations. It unpacks the conceptual boundaries and semantic margins of such notions as 
war and peace, unity and national interests, and so forth and reveals political convictions 
that the participants of political discussions (conflict) have and, therefore, it becomes 
possible to assume how the conflictual situation may resolve and if the parties are able to 
reach consensus. Second, it serves as an instrument of political action, engenders change4 
and hence constructs and reconstructs political reality.5 As Lisa Wedeen notes, “the use 
of words, the understanding of abstract concepts, and the enactment of everyday practices 
produce specific logics and generate observable political effects.”6 Third, it illustrates the 
fluctuating, multilayered and contextual identities of “Self” and “Other” and shows 
complex patterns of mutual representation. Thus, according to Hannah Arendt, actors 
reveal their identities through public speech and performative actions: “in acting and 
speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world.”7 Fourth, since discourse and counter-
discourse is frequently understood as a form of social interaction 8  and an action 
embedded in social context, the study of it illuminates the relations between the state and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 204. 
5 As Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough note, “it is an important characteristic of 
the economic, social and cultural changes, that they exist as discourses as well as 
processes that are taking place outside discourse,” and that these processes are shaped by 
these discourses substantively.  
Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 4. 
6  Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008), 15. 
7 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), 179-
180.  
8 For further discussion see Teun A. Van Dijk, Discourse as Social Interaction (London: 
Sage, 2004), 336. 
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the society. Both official and counter-narratives reflect the articulation, distribution and 
contestation over the meanings of normative categories, and such concepts as war, peace, 
nation and state, and more. Finally, the study of discursive practices sheds light on the 
political culture of a given society. There are linguistic dimensions of political culture, 
which is defined by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba as “attitudes toward the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system”9 and 
which is reflected in the discourse. In addition, political culture reveals complex relations 
within the state-society-individual structure, illustrates power relations within the 
political field (Bourdieu) 10 and reflects the hegemonic ideology. Thus, discourse in its 
linguistic and performative forms mirrors social structures. The mutually constitutive 
relations between discourse and social structures should be emphasized: discourse is 
determined by social structures and it reproduces these structures and, hence affects the 
societies, sustaining continuity or triggering change.11 In this regard David Howarth and 
Yannis Stavrakakis note, “discourses are concrete systems of social relations and 
practices that are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical institution, 
which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), 12.  
10 Pierre Bourdieu argues that societies are divided into autonomous spheres of play, 
fields. Each functions according to specific set of values and regulations, i.e., capital (see 
Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992)).  
Discourse reflects power hierarchy within each field and serves as a way of struggle over 
political capital.   
11 Fairclough, Language and Power, 42. 
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between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders.’ They always involve the exercise of power.”12 In a 
similar manner Pierre Bourdieu characterizes the nature of utterance, saying that 
“utterances are not only signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also signs of 
wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be 
believed and obeyed (his emphasis).”13 This power aspect of discourse will be analyzed 
in this study. 
Language is not the sole system of signification that constructs political discourse. 
Lisa Wedeen introduces the analysis of semiotic practices as a useful tool for 
understanding the complex nature of political discourse. This “meaning-oriented” 
approach studies how “symbols are inscribed in concrete actions and how they operate to 
produce observable political effects.” 14  Commemoration through mourning and 
celebrations, epic narratives, political spectacles, military parades and so forth all 
represent forms of political discourse and can explain the meanings invested in particular 
events and notions that are invoked and consumed by political actors. These practices 
reflect cultural imagination, reveal previously dominant political discourses, and thus 
show the political dynamics of the society in all its complexity. Other symbolic forms, 
such as visual images, also help us understand the formation, development and effects of 
political discourse.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis,” in Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, ed. David Howarth, Aletta J. 
Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 4. 
13 Pierre Bourdieu, “Language and Symbolic Power,” in The Discourse Reader, ed.Adam 
Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland (London: Routledge, 1999), 502.  
14  Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” The 
American Political Science Review 96, no. 4 (2002): 714. 
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In this research I will trace the development of political discourse in Egypt 
between 1971 and 1981. Three key events in Egyptian history were chosen for this 
analysis: the October or Ramadan War of 1973, the Peace Treaty between Israel and 
Egypt in 1979 and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. These events are 
connected to each other by a continuum of discursive and performative practices. 
However, there are significant ruptures and semantic shifts in this continuum, which form 
the object of this study. How did the representation of Israel as the Zionist entity (al-
kiyan al-sahyuni)15 transform into the perception of it as a party to the Peace Treaty? 
How did the narrative about “the mobilization of every effort for the sake of 
confrontation with the enemy”16 turn into the desire to overcome “the wall of suspicion, 
fear, hate, and misunderstanding that has for so long existed between Israel and the 
Arabs”?17 How could the annual celebrations of the glorious al-‘ubur (the crossing of the 
Suez Canal) sit with Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and his address to the Knesset? Indeed, 
Sadat himself commented on this particular paradox in his speech to the Israeli 
Parliament:  
No one could ever conceived that the president of the biggest Arab state, 
which bears the heaviest burden and the main responsibility pertaining to 
the cause of war and peace in the Middle East, should declare his 




15 “Importance of Escalation of Arab Struggle,” Cairo Press Review, Al-Goumhouria,  6 
July 1973.  
16 Ibid. 25 July 1973.  
17 Zeev Maoz and Allison Astorino, “The Cognitive Structure of Peacemaking: Egypt and 
Israel, 1970-1978,” Political Psychology 13, no. 4 (1992): 647. 
18 "Address made to Israel's Knesset." Essential Speeches (January 2009): 0. Academic 
Search Premier, EBSCO host (accessed January 23, 2011). 
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There are historical explanations for such changes in political behavior in Egypt, 
based upon domestic, regional and international variables. To explain such shifts, a 
number of political scientists have analyzed changes in the regional balance of power or 
applied “leader-centered” approach, exploring the operational codes and the 
psychological idiosyncrasies of the Egyptian leader. 19  The question of why such 
discursive transformation took place is beyond the scope of this study and needs to be 
addressed more comprehensively by historians or political scientists. Of particular 
concern here are the ways in which this change in political discourse occurred through 
the use of words and various practices. It is also important to analyze the context of 
formation and the nature of the most salient counter-narrative of that time and its 
complex interrelations with the official discourse.  
In the analysis of discourse the context is crucial, hence, the first chapter of this 
work is devoted to the historical background of the events under study. It is important to 
remember that context does not represent a constant, but is fluid, flexible and subject to 
change. There is an “objective” historical context and there is the context created by the 
discourse. The study of this discursive context reveals the ways in which people use 
words, establish signs and interpret meanings and act. Discourse has the ability to 
construct and constitute notions (e.g., unity), to create entities and norms (e.g., homeland, 
cooperation) and position political actors (foe and ally), which alters the representation of 
the context. Discourse does not only reflect reality, but in many ways constructs it. 
However, discourses (as much as contexts) are not “omnipotent” – they are the products 
of particular political forces. As D. Howarth and Y. Stavrakakis point out, “discourses are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 For further discussion see Ibrahim Karawan, “Sadat and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 2 (1994): 250-252. 
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contingent and historical constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political 
forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond 
their control.”20 
The second chapter traces the transformation of the official discourse in Egypt 
during 1973-1981 and the discrepancies and ruptures that characterize this change. An 
analysis of counter-discourses, namely the radical Islamist narrative, elucidates some of 
the methodological questions raised earlier. Firsthand materials from Egyptian 
newspapers, works by Egyptian intellectuals and texts by the “producers” of counter-
narratives constitute the foundations of this chapter. Both hegemonic and counter-
discourses interact with each other through deliberation and contestation over ideas and 
policies. Steve Buckler identifies three levels of discourse: theory, ideology and 
rhetoric.21 On the level of ideology, discourse possesses action-guiding potential and 
seeks to create solidarity with regard to the action agenda.22 The hegemonic discourse of 
the Egyptian government was operating on this level. At the level of rhetoric actors 
compete for power in the political arena and this was the medium through which counter-
discourses functioned. Clashes between these discourses with different aims and political 
agendas culminated in the assassination of Anwar Sadat and showed the different ways in 
which ideas operate in politics.     
The third chapter of the study focuses on the “practical” aspects of discourse and 
addresses the commemoration of the Egyptian victory in the Ramadan War of 1973. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Howarth and Stavrakakis, 4. 
21  Steve Buckler, “Theory, Ideology, Rhetoric: Ideas in Politics and the Case of 
“Community” in Recent Political Discourse,” British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 9, no.1 (2007): 36.  
22 Ibid., 37.!
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These practices communicated a particular political message, reflected a verbal discourse 
and were sustained by it. Analysis of performative practices sheds light on the 
mechanisms of group identity formation and illustrates the forces that engender social 
change.     
This research aims to illustrate that the correlation between political discourse and 
political outcomes is not direct. “Successful” rhetoric does not necessarily produce 
legitimacy for the regime, or lead to “successful” political agendas and actions.23  
Discourse, which is driven by political pragmatism and national interests and seems 
coherent, consistent and rational, may produce unexpected reactions from the consumers 
of this discourse – here the assassination of Anwar Sadat by al-Jihad is a compelling 
example. This shows that change in discourse does not necessarily entail shifts in social 
perceptions and identities. This study embraces an interpretivist method of analysis, 
which is based on a careful reading of the texts 24 and draws on insights from the fields of 
linguistics and social theory.     
This research raises general questions of how the discursive transformation occurs 
in situations of conflict, how it is presented to the audience and perceived by it and what 
the limitations of political language are. Hence, it contributes to the lasting debate within 
the field of socio-linguistics about the nature of language (including its political aspects) 
and its effects. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For further discussion see Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, 
and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 5. 

















The very act of locating the occasion or the text 
in its appropriate context is not merely to provide 
the historical background, but actually to begin 
the process of interpretation.25 
 
 In order to understand the discursive transformation that took place in Egypt 
during the period under study, the historical context must be analyzed. Michel Foucault 
(1972) argues: “the ‘situational context’ of a statement (the social situation in which it 
occurs) and its ‘verbal context’ (its position in relation to other statements which precede 
and follow it) determine the form it takes, and the way it is interpreted.”26 Therefore, 
understanding the historical framework within which the discursive transformation took 





25 David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British 
Monarchy and the “Inventing of Tradition,” c.1820-1977,” in The Invention of  Tradition 
ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 105. 
26 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 47. 
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Interwar Period (1967-1973) 
 
International and Regional Contexts 
 
As a result of the Six-Day War of 1967 Israel gained control over East Jerusalem 
and the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, the Sinai and the Gaza 
Strip  from Egypt,27 and became the strongest military power in the region. With the 
exception of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which were considered a pivotal gain of 
al-Naksa,28 Israeli political opinion about the newly conquered territories was divided 
between those who deemed them crucial “for Israel’s security and those who saw them as 
negotiable in return for peace settlements.”29 After the contested discussions about the 
future of the new territories a cabinet decision was taken on 19 June 1967: “Israel 
proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt and Syria based on the 
international border and the security needs of Israel.” 30  The international border 
stipulated that Gaza Strip was a part of Israel. Moreover, Israel insisted on freedom of 
navigation in the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and demanded 
guarantees of overflying rights in the Straits and the demilitarization of the Sinai 
Peninsula. 31  Egypt and Syria rejected these conditions, insisting on the complete 
withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. Although the irreconcilable position of 
the Arab states towards Israel was restated vigorously during the Khartoum summit in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Elizabeth Monroe and A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973. 
Background and Events (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), 1. 
28 Setback. An Arabic name for the defeat in 1967 War. 
29 T.G. Fraser, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Macmillan Palgrave, 2004), 82-83. 
30 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2000), 253. 
31 Ibid., 254. 
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September,32 the balance in the Arab-Israeli dispute changed fundamentally, in that the 
existence of Israel was no longer an issue. The return of the territories occupied during 
the war became the Arabs’ most pressing concern. 33  The change in the regional 
equilibrium required a more flexible policy from the Arab states, which deemed the 
possibility of indirect negotiations and political rather than military means of resolving 
the dispute feasible. Israel, however, interpreted the message from Khartoum as obdurate 
and final and the opportunity for negotiations between the parties to the conflict was lost.     
International reaction to the postwar Arab-Israeli dispute was reflected in UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which affirmed the “withdrawal 
of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”34  The absence of 
a definite article before the word territories created multiple controversies around the 
interpretation of the document. While the Israelis argued the Resolution implied the 
withdrawal from “some” territories, the Arabs insisted the Resolution meant “all” the 
territories. The Palestinians opposed the document, because it acknowledged “territorial 
integrity and the sovereignty of every state (my emphasis) in the region,” including 
Israel, and did not mention a future Palestinian state, confining the Palestinian cause to 
the “just settlement of the refugee problem.”35 Egypt and Jordan agreed on settlement, 
but insisted that Israel relinquished its conquests. Israel did not accept the Resolution 
officially until 1970, demanding direct negotiations with the Arabs regarding the peace 
agreements. Gunnar Jarring’s mission, aimed to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement based !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The three Noes of Khartoum: no negotiation, no recognition and no peace with Israel. 
33 James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 273. 
34 U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, in Gelvin, The Modern 
Middle East: A History, 316-317. 
35 Ibid., 316-317. 
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on the UN Resolution, proved generally unsuccessful, because the parties to the conflict 
were too far apart in their mutual expectations and demands. The intransigent position of 
Golda Meir concerning the conquered territories made the parties drift even further apart. 
She was elected prime minister of Israel in March 1969 and believed that “every square 
inch of the territory of Israel had been nourished by the blood of her children,” 36 so that 
any withdrawal to prewar borders was unacceptable without direct negotiations and peace 
treaties with the Arabs.     
The new wave of Palestinian refugees and “the growth of the Israeli settlements 
along the Jordan valley and outside Hebron triggered the revival of the Palestinian 
liberation movement.”37 A Fatah38 underground campaign, initiated in the winter of 
1967-68, was untimely and resulted in Israeli retaliation. But it demonstrated the 
Palestinian resilience and soon revealed the new dynamics within Fatah itself.39 Under 
the guidance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) the armed struggle was 
conducted mainly in Gaza and Jordan, which posed a threat to King Hussein’s rule. A 
number of attacks on Israeli airliners took place between 1968 and 1970, which brought 
Palestinian grievances to the attention of the international community. The most 
conspicuous manifestation of the growing power and influence of the PLO were the 
events of “Black September” 1970 in Jordan.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 
220. 
37 Shlaim, 285-87. 
38 The largest faction of the PLO. 
39 The Charter of 1964 was revised and emphasized the leading role of the PLO in the 
national armed struggle and affirmed the supremacy of Arafat as a leader of the 
Palestinian liberation movement.  
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Israel’s diplomatic immobility and its unwillingness to withdraw from the 
occupied territories led President Nasser to abandon any aspirations for a peaceful 
solution, and “his famous slogan “That which was taken by force can only by recovered 
by force” was coined.”40 The War of Attrition between Israel and the Arabs began in 
1967. Using Egypt’s demographic advantage over Israel, its inability to wage static 
warfare and its sensitivity towards casualties,41 Nasser made it clear that “it would only 
be a matter of time before Egypt attempted to recapture the Sinai.”42 The Sinai served as 
a buffer for the Israelis against Egyptian attacks. While military bombardments, air 
attacks and raids were being launched on Israeli positions near the Canal and the 
Jordanian border, a new Republican administration in the United States with Richard 
Nixon as president, Henry Kissinger as his national security adviser and William Rogers 
as secretary of state elicited a new peace plan. The Rogers Plan was based on UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 and called Israel to return to the international border and 
address the Palestinian refugee problem. The Plan was rejected by Israel and the War of 
Attrition continued until July 1970, after which both sides resumed negotiations and 
accepted the cease-fire promoted by Rogers.    
 
Domestic Scene 
Nasser’s death on 28 September 1970 brought his vice-president Anwar Sadat to 
power. For the first six months he did not have much influence and seemed to be the 
president whom Nasser’s closest supporters wanted. From September 1970 until January !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Shlaim, 289. 
41 Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, 
and Military History, Vol.1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc., 2008),175. 
42 Ibid.,175. 
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1971 Sadat seemingly respected the collective leadership principle while quietly forging 
his own support base. He managed to safeguard backing by the military and the police, 
benefiting from power rivalries and arguments among the leading political figures. He 
skillfully drew near those who Nasser antagonized43 and, as John Waterbury argues, 
relied on the rural middle class and the rural elites.44 The perception of Sadat as a 
compromise figure or a transitional solution changed after May 15 1971. The president 
carried out the “corrective revolution” (thawrat al-tashih), which aimed to liquidate the 
Nasserist power centers (marakiz al-quwwa). Thus, Sadat “arrested the “barons” of the 
Nasserist left, who had sought to impose collective leadership on the country”45 and 
manipulate the “Colonel Yes” (bikbashi sahh)46 behind the scene.  
Nasser’s successor inherited a burdensome legacy: a crushing defeat in the 1967 
War and territorial losses; a particularly bad financial situation with an increasing budget 
deficit and currency shortages; and a complex state of affairs in both domestic and 
foreign political arenas. It was the time to revise international political alliances and seek 
ways to achieve the two chief goals of Sadat’s pre-1973 war rule: “freeing the national 
territories occupied by the Israeli enemy, and preserving the “gains” of the July 
revolution.”47 In order to restore national respect and to recover the Sinai, Sadat altered 
the course of Egypt’s foreign policy. While the Soviet Union could rebuild the Egyptian 
armed forces, only the United States could assist Egypt in its endeavors and apply 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Namely, some Marxist figures. 
44 See John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two 
Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 504. 
45 Martin W. Daly, The Cambridge History of Egypt. Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End 
of the Twentieth Century, Vol.2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 359. 
46 Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave , 2000), 43. 
47 Daly, 360. 
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pressure on Israel.48 Sadat made several attempts to demonstrate Egypt’s willingness for 
rapprochement with the United States, which were treated rather coolly. At the same 
time, Egypt depended on Soviet military and financial assistance; hence the balancing 
strategy demanded a skillful approach. In March 1971 Sadat announced that relations 
with the Soviet Union were intact and continued to attack the United States: “We have no 
faith in America. I have written to Nixon, telling him we put no trust in his country’s 
promises.”49 Although the agreement with the Soviets promised lucrative projects and the 
reorganization of the army, Moscow had its own concerns. It was not in the interest of the 
Soviet Union to support the arms race in the region to the point of confrontation with the 
United States. At the same time arms supplies were one of the ways it could exercise 
indirect influence over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although supporting the Arabs, the 
Soviets did not make any anti-Israeli pronouncements.50  
By 1972 it became clear that while the United States was providing Israel with 
complete support, the Soviets were not planning to contribute to the tensions. President 
Sadat continued to announce daily that the year 1972 was “decisive” for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, but the political dynamics on the regional and international levels did not 
promise any “decisive” developments. Realizing that the Soviet Union was seeking 
détente with the United States and was thus not ready to offer Egypt its full support, 
Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972. This gesture did not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Thus in May 1971 Sadat signed a “Friendship and Cooperation Treaty” with the 
Soviets, which promised to reconstruct the Egyptian army. At the time there were no 
diplomatic relations between the United States and Egypt. 
49 Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San-Francisco: American Middle East 
Research, 1980), 93-94. 
50 Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, The October War (Cairo: American University in 
Cairo Press, 1993),128-129. 
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engender any substantial response from the United States, but unofficial channels of 
communication between the countries were opened. At that time, president “Nixon was 
trying hard to win a measure of support from Jewish voters”51 and could not make any 
positive political moves towards the Egyptians.  
The diplomatic stalemate sparked risings in Cairo. In January and February 
university students were demonstrating. Slogans criticized “the United States for 
supporting Israel, the USSR for failing to provide Egypt sufficient arms, and Sadat and 
Sadiq52 for questionable leadership.”53 Later in the year Canal Zone refugees and private 
sector workers joined the demonstrators, demanding improvements in working and living 
conditions. “The strains of the war economy were obvious: defense spending increased 
from 11.1 percent of the GNP in 1966 to 21.7 percent in 1972.”54 Moreover, many of the 
recruits, who had been kept in the army awaiting a new war since 1967, wanted to return 
to civilian life.  
Once every means of changing the post-1967 status quo peacefully had been 
exhausted, Sadat decided that it would take another war to make Israel relinquish the 
Sinai:  
Our … commitments are being put to the test. The problem of liberating 
the land     is central to our life…The battle will be fought using whatever 
weapons are available. We will plan for this….Our situation will have to 
change or our cause will end, die, and disintegrate… 1973.55   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Fraser, 92. 
52 Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Sadiq. 
53 George W. Gawrych, The Albatross of Decisive Victory: War and Policy Between 





In such tense circumstances it was becoming clear that a new war was inevitable. 
Strategic alliance with Syria was pivotal for the future war, since this would force Israel 
to divide its forces to defend two fronts. Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad began serious 
preparations. Egyptian and Syrian generals, who possessed sophisticated Soviet weapons 
and led trained soldiers, worked out a strategy based on the element of “surprise.” They 
believed that concessions from Israel would follow after the Arab armies broke through 
on the Golan front and simultaneously crossed the Suez Canal. This strategy would deny 
Israel strategic and tactical mobility. Resting on the laurels of its 1967 victory and 
equipped with American weaponry, Israel’s intelligence agency played down Arab 
fighting capacity and the intense preparations of the Arab soldiers, who in one of Sadat’s 
graphic phrases, had been “eating sand”56 while training.  
On 6 October 1973 the Egyptian and Syrian troops were moved into position for 
an attack. The timing chosen for an offensive was the most favorable – the Jews were 
preparing for the most sacred day in their calendar, Yom Kippur; Golda Meir was visiting 
France and then had to fly to Vienna after Palestinian gunmen attacked a train carrying 
Russian Jewish immigrants through Austria. Abba Eban, the foreign minister, was in 
New York attending a UN meeting. Washington was in turmoil after the exposure of the 
Watergate scandal and the vice president was facing tax charges.57 In this chaotic 
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Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of 1973 
 The Ramadan war demonstrated an impressive performance on the part of the 
Arab armies and their capacity to fight in a tougher way and coordinate their moves more 
effectively. It also revealed “political solidarity and a close cooperation between the Arab 
states with regard to arms supplies and the use of oil weapon in the pursuit of military-
political ends.”58 The indisputable moral victory of the Arabs destroyed the myth of 
“invincibility” that had surrounded the Israeli army.  
 The Egyptian and Syrian offensive began at 14:00 hours on 6 October 1973 with 
attacks on Israeli units on the Golan front, the storming of the Suez Canal, heavy artillery 
bombardment on the Bar-Lev Line and its subsequent destruction (Operation Badr).59 
The Israeli government underestimated the extent of the Arab preparations, and no mass 
mobilization of the Israeli forces was ordered.60 The strategic question for the Arabs was 
how to overcome the enormous advantages possessed by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), 
namely its maneuvering abilities and air superiority.61 Moreover, in order to break 
through the Bar-Lev Line, it was necessary for the Egyptians to cross the Canal and 
breach the sand walls that the Israelis had constructed. It was also difficult to cross the 
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Canal using the heavy vehicles that the Egyptians had at their disposal. Relying on the 
Soviet 9M14, SA-7, SAM-6 missiles and anti-aircraft ZSU-23-4 guns, which sheltered 
the Arab ground advance, Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly decided to launch a limited 
offensive (e.g., Operation High Minarets), but remain on the defensive on the tactical 
level. The first wave of infantry crossed the Canal at 2:15 and breached the Bar-Lev Line. 
It fell after two hours of intense fighting, and the infantry penetrated further into the 
Canal Zone. Israel’s losses were compensated for generously by the United States, which 
provided Israel with new and more advanced weapons and equipment.62 It was believed 
in Washington that an Israeli defeat would appear to be an American defeat as well: it 
would imply the superiority of Soviet weapons. Nevertheless, the situation on the Golan 
front was even more devastating for the Israelis 63 until they managed to recapture their 
positions and pushed the Syrian armies back. After this success, Golda Meir ordered an 
offensive into Syria, which changed the course of the war. To divert Israeli attention from 
the Golan front Sadat commanded the troops to leave the air defense umbrella and 
advance further into the Sinai.64 It proved to be a disaster for the Egyptian positions in the 
peninsula. Major General Ariel Sharon launched an offensive operation Gazelle, which 
allowed him to break through the Canal. The Egyptian air defense network was disrupted 
and the army could not fend off the attack. It was one of the largest tank battles ever 
fought, and inflicted severe losses on the Egyptians. The Egyptian retreat in the Sinai 
coincided with the Syrian defeats on the Golan front.  
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 The Soviets called for a cease-fire several times, but Henry Kissinger delayed the 
negotiations. He expected Israel to regain the positions it had lost, but also feared Egypt’s 
total humiliation.65  On 17 October the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries imposed an oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands in retaliation 
for America’s massive airlift to Israel. After Kissinger’s visit to Moscow and intensive 
Soviet-American negotiations, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution 338 on 22 
October, urging both sides to stop fighting. However, the Israelis did not observe the 
Resolution and continued the offensive, using their air-to-air and air-to-surface 
advantages.66 The trapped Egyptian Third Army and the threat of its destruction by the 
Israelis led to the confrontation between the super powers. The Soviet Union posed an 
ultimatum to the United States and warned it would undertake unilateral action, if UN 
Resolution 339 from 24 October was not enforced. On 26 October 1973 UN Security 
Council Resolution 340 ended the fourth Arab-Israeli war.    
 
Postwar Disengagement: on the Road to Peace (1974-1977) 
Regional and International Arena 
 The results of the October war were mixed: Israel achieved impressive military 
gains and successfully countered the attacks of the Arab armies, pushing them back. 
However, the myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered. Without American military and 
diplomatic support Israel would not have been able to position its army on the west bank 
of the Canal and threaten Damascus. On the contrary, the Arab states displayed 
unprecedented cooperation, spectacular offensives and the ability to use the “oil weapon” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to achieve political and military goals. The moral victory of the Arabs forced Israel to 
negotiate. In this regard the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat noted: 
Egyptian military forces performed a miracle by any military standard 
(‘ala ay miqyas ‘askari). And they devoted themselves to the fullest to 
their duty. They captured the spirit of the entire epoch (istaw‘abat al-‘asr 
kulluhu) training and using weapons, but also in terms of knowledge and 
abilities. When they received an order to respond to the provocation of the 
enemy and to curb the defiance of his arrogance, the army proved itself 
strong. These forces took in their hands several fronts (sudur), which 
happened for the first time and surprised the enemy and deprived it of its 
balance with the swift maneuvering.67  
  
 The US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger directed the postwar negotiations 
between the parties to the conflict. His “step by step” diplomatic strategy, aimed at 
“incremental progress beginning with the military disengagement between Israel and 
Egypt as well as Israel and Syria,” 68  unfolded against the backdrop of Nixon’s 
resignation, the victory of the communists in South Vietnam and the political defeat of 
Israel in the October War. Post-war developments in Israel brought Yitzhak Rabin to 
replace Golda Meir, who resigned after an inquiry revealed the mistakes made before and 
during the war. For Prime Minister Rabin, wittily referred to as “the sphinx with no 
secrets,” two issues were above all others: “Israel’s security and Israel’s strategic 
partnership with the United States.”69 For Anwar Sadat it was important to achieve a 
settlement under American auspices. In these circumstances Kissinger began his famous 
“shuttle diplomacy.”  
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A cease-fire agreement signed between Israel and Egypt on 11 November 1973 
stipulated “the movement of supplies to Suez and the Third Army, replacement of Israeli 
by UN checkpoints, the exchange of prisoners, and discussions of the separation of 
forces.”70 Soon after the agreement was signed, Kissinger received confirmation from 
Saudi Arabia that the oil embargo would be lifted once Israel returned to its 1967 borders 
and the peace talks resumed. The next destination for Kissinger after Cairo and Jerusalem 
was Moscow, where the superpowers agreed to hold a peace conference in Geneva. 
During the meeting Jordan and Egypt negotiated the situation along the Suez Canal with 
Israel. Syria did not participate in the Conference, but did not try to undermine it. 
Following Kissinger’s successive trips to Cairo and Jerusalem, a disengagement 
agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed on 18 January 1974. It marked the Israeli 
zone of control west of the Mitla and Gidi passes and allowed Egyptian tanks and 
battalions to be stationed east of the Canal, a provision that Sadat assured he would not 
abuse. 71 Sadat gave secret promises that Israeli cargoes would be permitted to pass 
through the Canal once all the obstacles were eliminated. This agreement laid the 
foundation for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the 1967 war and 
gave Kissinger opportunity to focus on other fronts of Arab-Israeli disengagement, 
namely the Golan front and Jordan.72  
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In March 1975 Kissinger resumed his “shuttle diplomacy” in order to promote an 
interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. The major point of contestation was the 
passes, on which Israel remained inflexible and demanded a declaration of non-
belligerence from Egypt, while agreeing to withdraw to the eastern edge of the passes.73 
This was unacceptable to Sadat. President Ford and Kissinger tried to apply pressure on 
Israel and threatened to “reassess” US Middle Eastern policies. This message had the 
opposite effect on the Israelis, and their intransigence grew. Hence, Kissinger’s “step by 
step” strategy failed in 1975 “when Israel refused to return the strategic Mitla and Giddi 
passes and the Abu Rhudeis oil field to Egyptian sovereignty without an Egyptian pledge 
of non belligerence.”74 
Rabin’s visit to Washington in June 1975 and the meeting between Ford and 
Sadat in Salzburg at the beginning of June revived another attempt at an interim 
agreement between the parties. The Ford-Sadat consensus was founded on the mutual 
desire to avoid war and limit Soviet influence in the region. A series of concessions made 
by Israel and Egypt preceded the meetings: Sadat reopened the Suez Canal and Israel 
reduced its forces there. 
The Sinai II agreement between Israel and Egypt was concluded on 4 September 
1975 and provided for the Israeli withdrawal from the Abu Rhudeis oil fields and the 
passes.75 The oil fields and the passes constituted a part of the demilitarized buffer zone 
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and were under UN control. In return the United States signed an agreement with Israel, 
promising it support with regard to Israel’s military and defense requirements and 
economic needs.   
The Sinai II represented a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt rather 
than a step towards a comprehensive Middle East settlement. It caused uproar in the Arab 
world. Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians felt that Sadat was pursuing strictly Egyptian 
interests and that by signing the agreement he was weakening the overall Arab position, 
which primarily focused on the return of the Occupied Territories. And indeed, the 
agreement did not produce any change in the destiny of the Palestinians, the main victims 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although the status of the PLO underwent a significant 
transformation after the October War,76 the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon, where 
the Palestinians were the principal victims, undermined whatever diplomatic 
breakthrough had been achieved in 1974-1975. The intervention of Syria in 1976 stopped 
the first phase of the Lebanese civil war, but did not address the larger issues that had 
sparked it.77  
When Jimmy Carter was elected president of the United States and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski was appointed his National Security Adviser, political and public opinion 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted. It was felt that the core issue of the dispute should 
be addressed, namely, the fate of the Palestinian people. The Brookings Institution, an 
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influential Washington think tank, put human rights at the forefront of its agenda, in 
which it was supported by the president and his advisers.78 Meanwhile, major political 
changes took place in Israel with the electoral triumph of Menachem Begin, who 
advocated Israeli territorial integrity. His views were in stark contrast to those of his 
predecessor from the Labor Party, especially with regard to the Occupied Territories and 
dealing with the PLO and Egypt.  
 
Domestic Scene 
 Serious changes in Egyptian domestic politics took place after the October War. 
Liberalization measures from “above” coincided with Sadat’s attempts to consolidate his 
powers and augment his legitimacy. The popularity earned from the October victory 
allowed him to leave Nasser’s legacy behind and launch his own project for Egypt. 
Although one can argue that there was a degree of logic and political calculation behind 
Sadat’s actions and agendas, on the whole his political and economic course was 
characterized by a lack of consistency and multiple contradictions. 
As Martin Daly argues, the war “allowed the regime to transform...a military 
defeat - for the first time Israeli troops had acquired a foothold on the African bank of the 
Canal and the Third Army, surrounded at the Suez, only escaped capitulation because of 
American pressure on Israel – into a political victory.”79 The new government program, 
reflected in the October Document of March 1974, launched the policy of infitah, an 
attempt to attract foreign investors and opening local markets to their activities. Under 
Law 43 such investors received significant tax and customs privileges. The open door !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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policy eliminated the public-sector monopoly in domestic banking, prioritizing foreign 
banks and currency.80  
The economic projects inspired by the infitah were mostly in the spheres of 
tourism, banking and investment and did not bring sought-after innovations and 
technologies to Egypt. In 1976 Sadat began negotiations with the IMF, asking it to 
provide loans for Egypt; the IMF demanded the removal of subsidies on basic 
commodities. Such “structural adjustment” engendered mass protests: demonstrators 
attacked the most visible symbols of “economic liberalization” – nightclubs, shop 
windows and travel agencies. The economic and social consequences of the infitah were 
devastating – the budget deficit increased and Egypt was dragged into the spiral of short-
term debt.81 Standards of living declined, which forced many young Egyptians to seek 
employment opportunities in the Gulf countries.82 Hence, infitah bred a new form of 
Egyptian economic and political dependence.  
 Significant political changes took place in Egypt between 1974 and 1977. After 
Anwar Sadat had carried out the “corrective revolution,” he announced his intention to 
establish a “state of institutions” (dawlat al-mu’assasat), where the rule of law would be 
guaranteed. The first step in this direction was the constitution of platforms (manabir) 
within the Arab Socialist Union, in which every segment of the Egyptian nation would be 
included. After the discussions, multiple projects were proposed to create these platforms, 
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but Sadat accepted only those of the right, center and left orientations and rejected the 
Nasserist project, fearing the possible re-establishment of the Nasserist party.  
Economic liberalization, presented as an achievement of the October victory, and 
the prospects of fruitful cooperation with the West and the moderate Arab regimes, 
coincided with further political transformations. Between 1974 and 1979 the president 
attempted to introduce a pluralist political structure, which would provide diversity in 
political life (ta‘addud) but preserve the “gains” of the Revolution. In fact, Sadat sought a 
controlled parliamentary system, where “the social forces he represented would be 
dominant.”83 Indeed, the “Egypt party” that he promoted won 280 seats against 12 for the 
right and 2 for the left in the first plural elections of October 1976.84 However, the 
reconstruction of the Wafd Party in 1978 and the creation of the Socialist Labor Party 
shattered Sadat’s expectations for an “obedient” opposition: the Wafdists hurled criticism 
on the regime’s devotion to the US and to further rapprochement with Israel and “froze” 
its activities. The opposition from “outside” the system was not tolerated and those who 
disturbed “social peace and internal front” had to be barred from political activity.85 
Eventually, the Shame (‘ayb) law, prohibiting any criticism of the regime, was 
introduced.  
While trying to eliminate his ideological and political competitors, Sadat created 
the National Democratic Party in 1978 to strengthen the ideology of “democratic 
socialism.” The platform of the party announced its intention to build a state based on 
religious values and scientific innovations, reaffirmed that Shar‘ia was the main source 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Aoude,19. 
84 Popular participation during the elections was low. See Daly, 367. 
85 Daly, 366. 
"(!
of legislation, and claimed that the attempts of the right and the left “minority” to disturb 
the “majority” represented by the president were illegitimate and disruptive for national 
unity and peace.86 After his “liberalization” policies, the president tried to create an 
illusion of mass participation in politics by resorting to plebiscites on various topics: “the 
confirmation of Egypt’s democratic social orientation; its membership of the Arab nation; 
the Arab-Israeli peace agreement, the social origins of the Revolution and the Shar‘ia 
being the main source of the law, and other.”87 
The most contradictory act that Sadat initiated, which would be fraught with fatal 
consequences for his regime and himself, was his amnesty for the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The movement underwent ideological transformation while in exile in Saudi Arabia 
during Nasser’s rule. On their return to Egypt, al-Ikhwan were allowed to establish 
Islamic associations (jama‘at islamiyya) in the universities, but could not operate as a 
political party.88 In this way Sadat was hoping to marginalize the “atheists” (Nasserists 
and Marxists), but to keep the activities of the Brotherhood under control. To placate his 
“new allies,” a law of apostasy was adopted in 1977, which was one of the many 
manifestations of the “re-Islamization” of Egyptian society. It was especially noticeable 
in the media and the general appearance and behavior of the citizens. Soon Sadat’s 
“flirtation” with the Islamists proved to be dangerous – his “new favorites” turned against 
him.89 While the Muslim Brotherhood operated within the set of rules outlined by the 
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regime and tried to promote itself in parliament by forging alliances with the Wafd and 
the Socialist Labor and the Liberal parties, various radical groups that adhered to the 
agenda of Sayyid Qutb mushroomed in the 1970s. Mass dissatisfaction with Sadat’s 
domestic and foreign policy was voiced by the Islamists, the right and the left, and 
exploded after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, which paved way for the 
Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. “The mask of democracy was gradually removed, 
revealing the regime’s repressive face”;90 representatives of the opposition, politicians, 
intellectuals, moderate and radical Islamists, activists from the right and the left wings of 
the spectrum, were accused of inciting the riots and thrown into jail in September 1981.91  
Hence, the bankruptcy of the infitah, which abandoned the policies of central 
planning, but failed to produce an economic miracle, and the impotence of political 
“liberalization” and “democratization,” which retained their authoritative and repressive 
nature, represented a dire omen for Sadat’s era, which would end tragically in 1981.  
 
1978- 1981: The Camp David Accords and  
the Assassination of President Sadat 
 The most remarkable about-turn in Egyptian foreign policy was the Camp David 
accords, signed on 17 September 1978 by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin at Camp 
David in the presence of Jimmy Carter. It was preceded by a series of secret meetings and 
preparations.  
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For example, during a meeting between Moshe Dayan and King Hussein of 
Jordan in London in the summer 1977 the possibility of a settlement between the two 
states was discussed. A month later a meeting between Dayan and the Egyptian Deputy 
Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami took place in Morocco. During the negotiations 
rapprochement between the two sides became more possible than ever. A courageous 
move was needed from any party to overcome the “psychological barrier” that Sadat 
frequently referred to.   
In 1976 Israeli politicians were still predicting a new war between Egypt and 
Israel and Sadat declared “Egypt could not enter into negotiations with Israel unless 
Israel first withdrew a further distance from the Egyptian territories it was still holding.”92 
In this uncertain atmosphere Sadat made a bold maneuver and announced his readiness to 
visit Jerusalem and negotiate peace with the enemy. The historic visit to Jerusalem and 
Sadat’s famous address to the Israeli Knesset took place in 20 November 1977. From the 
initiatives that Egypt had demonstrated during Sadat’s rule it was clear that the shift did 
not occur all at once. Indeed, Egypt had long been searching for some sort of 
disengagement with Israel. After Sadat announced that he “welcomed the Israelis to live 
among the Arab nations with full security and safety” and that he sought to achieve 
“durable peace based on justice,”93 Israelis “danced in the streets in near euphoria, shock 
waves rattled the Arab world, and the international community watched in disbelief.”94  
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The promising rapprochement that simultaneously earned applause and 
condemnation was difficult to transform into a lasting peace, as each side was pursuing 
different aims. While for Egypt the agreement had to be based on Israel’s withdrawal 
from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, fulfillment of the Palestinian aspirations for 
an independent state and the ending of war between Israel and all Arab nations,95 Begin 
was interested in a separate bilateral agreement with Egypt. He did not yield to the 
euphoria of the moment. He sought to eliminate the most powerful enemy of Israel and 
not to give promises to the Palestinians, which he may or may not have regretted later. 
Moreover, the expansion of illegal Jewish settlements in the Sinai was creating a series of 
obstacles for the peace process. In the meantime Egypt was witnessing a dramatic rise in 
Islamist political activity, and Sadat quickly became isolated both in his own country and 
from his counterparts in other Arab states. Fear of the growing antipathy between the 
parties, domestic opposition to Sadat’s peace initiative and other alarming developments 
in the Middle East96 pushed the United States to lay the groundwork for the negotiations.   
The Camp David Summit took place from 5 to 17 September 1978. After 
numerous concessions made by Egypt and the United States, Begin accepted the 
document. 97  There was no word, provision or paragraph that would stipulate the 
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resolution of the Palestinian problem;98 the phrase regarding the removal of the Israeli 
settlements in Gaza and West Bank was deleted; all references to Jerusalem were omitted 
from the agreement as well.99 Hence, the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” 
proved to be a failure. “The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace between Egypt and 
Israel” stipulated the establishment of normal relations between the countries following 
the partial 100 Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.  
Hence, the Agreement manifested the complete estrangement of Egypt from the 
Palestinian cause and provoked severe condemnation from Syria, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia. On his return to Israel Begin denounced the ambiguous provisions made about 
the occupied Palestinian territories in Camp David and encouraged the construction of 
new settlements, which undermined both Carter’s mission and Sadat’s efforts to achieve 
peace. The alarming developments in Egypt and a broader Middle East – the worsening 
situation in Lebanon, the revolution in Iran and the radical Islamist insurgency in Egypt - 
did not bode well.  
 In the 1970s Egypt was undergoing a profound socio-economic transformation. 
The demographic boom and the migration of young people from rural areas to the cities 
resulted in massive unemployment coupled with inflation, cronyism, nepotism, 
deteriorating of the socio-economic conditions and bitter disappointment with a political 
regime that failed to fulfill its promises. The crises of state legitimacy and traditional 
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religious authority, and disenchantment with barren secular ideologies triggered the 
revival of ideologies based on faith.101 Socio-economic hardships, the repressive nature 
of the ruling regime, dramatic political changes and instability on a regional level 
popularized narratives that advocated a violent overthrow of the government.  
 Another interesting phenomenon that originated in the dawn of the twentieth 
century and became conspicuous in the late 1960s and 1970s was the transformation of 
religious authority.102 Young engineers and doctors claimed the right to interpret religious 
texts and issue religious opinions (fatawa) without having had formal theological 
education. For instance, the electrical engineer who would become Sadat’s assassin 
issued religious pamphlets outlawing the ‘ulama, the “turbaned valets of those in power,” 
and calling for the assassination of Sadat, “the apostate of Islam nourished at the tables of 
Zionism and Imperialism.”103 These fringe groups that belonged to fundamentalist (al-
salafi), jihad, and al-takfir trends104 created counter-discourses to the hegemonic one of 
the government. They bitterly opposed Sadat’s peace initiatives and pursued regime 
change through a combination of preaching and violence.  
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On 6 October 1981, during a military parade dedicated to the anniversary of the 
October victory, army officers belonging to the radical Islamist group al-Jihad 
assassinated President Anwar Sadat. Mohammed Abdel Salam Farag who established the 
organization in 1979 planned to seize the “reigns of government once Egypt is engulfed 
in chaos after the murder.”105  
 As Dr. Rafa‘at Sayyed Ahmad notes, multiple “political mistakes, committed by 
Sadat” led to a violent political finale. The failures of al-infitah, the unpopular Peace 
Treaty with Israel (al-kiyan al sahyuni), a political “witch hunt” (al-mutarada al-
siyasiya) against the Left and Islamic forces, as well as the alienation of Sadat’s closest 
supporters, and a sharp socio-political polarization (al-istiqtab al-siyasi al-hadd) are the 
most obvious reasons that set the irreversible forces in motion.106 
 This brief analysis of the Sadat’s era provides the historical context, necessary to 
understand the discursive shift that occurred between 1971 and1981.  
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DISCURSIVE SHIFT THROUGH TEXTS: OFFICIAL DISCOURSE  
AND ISLAMIST COUNTER-NARRATIVE IN EGYPT  
(1972-1981)  
 
Language practices are inherently political insofar as  
they are among the ways individuals have at their disposal  
of gaining access to the production, distribution and  
consumption of symbolic and material resources.107 
 
 This chapter will focus on texts (mainly presidential speeches or statements, 
newspaper articles and other written texts), which illustrate the transformation in the 
official discourse in Egypt during the Sadat era and the counter-response that it provoked 
from various radical Islamist groups, namely al-Jihad. These texts reflect the universes of 
meaning constructed both by the regime and the radical Islamist opposition, and reveal 
the tropes that informed the texture of the political field at that time in Egypt. The texts 
demonstrate the inner dynamics of the discourses, their corpus and content, and the 
relationship between the discourses. Based on different values and promoting different 
agendas, these discourses reveal “the competition over resources, issues of moral probity 
and deprivation, of purity and impurity, and of progress and decay.”108 The ideological 
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107 Monica Heller, “Code-switching and the Politics of Language,” in A War of Words: 
Language and Conflict in the Middle East, ed. Yasir Suleiman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 11-12. 
108 Ibid., 5-6.  
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contestation expressed in the discourses illustrates the power relations between social 
groups and constructs political realities. In this regard Yasir Suleiman persuasively argue
that language “does not just reflect the reality, but acts on it, configuring it and shaping it 
in accord with a given ideology.”109  
 In his works Michel Foucault analyzed the repressive power of institutions and, 
by extension, of language, which represents an instrument through which power is 
projected and human knowledge categorized. It is clear from the study of both discourses 
in Egypt that they are based on exclusion, the use of dual oppositions, and the 
pronouncements of the “ultimate truth” and the “true” values. Hence, both of them are 
repressive. Claiming to be a “liberating” discourse, the counter-discourse of radical 
Islamists is in fact as repressive and exclusive as the official one. It is also controlled by 
those who have the right to utter, by what can be spoken of, and how something has to be 
spoken about. Pretention to possession of the ultimate truth and certain actions toward the 
implementation of this truth are generally repressive and disciplining in their nature. The 
recipients of both discourses consume certain notions, which are already categorized 
(e.g., who is the enemy, what did we fight for, on what principles will the future state be 
based, etc.); the discourses narrate certain stories, which contain mechanisms of social 
control,110 and determine how these stories should be understood. This chapter will 
illustrate how these aspects found expression in these two discourses.  
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 Among the various tropes that were a part of the official discourse during the 
Sadat period, several dominated in the discursive arena and underwent an explicit 
transformation over time. The first group of tropes includes Zionism and Israel (e.g., its 
nature, issues of war and peace, etc.), Imperialism, and the perception of political 
ideologies (Arabism, Egyptianism, Islamism). The second group embraces the concepts 
of the State and everything that is pertinent to it (e.g., notions of democracy, freedom, 
good governance and leadership, etc.). The third group comprises themes related to 
Society (e.g., citizenship, social unity and cohesion). The fourth group contains abstract 
notions (modernism, secularism, etc.). This chapter will address several of these tropes, 
especially those prominent in radical Islamist discourses. The scope of the paper does not 
allow for the detailed elaboration of every group of themes within the official discourse 
and may become a subject of another work. 
 
Israel, Zionism and Imperialism 
   The official rhetoric about Israel, Zionism and Imperialism changed dramatically 
during Sadat’s rule. When he accepted the presidency in October 1970, he announced his 
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shuhada’”) for the noble cause of October or the glorious days that the Third Army is 
living (“al-jaysh al-thalith salaba wa ya‘ish a‘dham ayam”). These stories constitute a 
discourse and should be understood within the structure of this discourse. For instance, in 
the Islamist cognitive map the state has fallen into the abyss of jahiliya, therefore, as the 
extensions of the state, state institutions should be dismantled and those who serve these 
institutions and this jahiliya state cannot be “true” Muslims. 
See al-Ahram, March 15 1974.   
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adherence to “the path of Gamal Abdel Nasser,”111 which implied repelling the danger 
that emanated from the “enemies” and liberating “the sacred national soil.”112 Israel was 
identified as the primary “enemy” of the Arab nation along with international Zionism 
and world Imperialism. In his speech to the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in November 
1970 Sadat announced: “All efforts, manpower, and economic resources will be 
mobilized until victory against Zionism and Imperialism is achieved.” 113  This 
representation of Israel as a “tiny, aggressive and expansionist state” 114  was 
monosemantic and void of inner complexities. Hence between 1970 and 1973 the 
discursive continuity from Nasser’s time was preserved.115  
 The “insidious trio” continued to dominate the official rhetoric after the October 
War, which in the words of Naguib Mahfouz represented “a man’s attunement with his 
existential reality; a challenge of his fears, and his decision to confront the greatest power 
of evil, a Revolution of the will, mind and spirit.”116 However, the trope of “just peace” 
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with Israel began to be articulated more clearly.117 Peace based on justice was juxtaposed 
with the “peace of aggression, conceit and arrogance,” which Israel, as assumed, was 
attempting to impose on the Arab world. In a speech in October 1973 Sadat emphasized 
the necessity of peace as a guarantee for the respect of “the legitimate rights of all the 
peoples” 118  of the region. Yet, he labeled Israel as the “force of terrorism” and 
admonished it - “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” – if it demonstrated aggression.119 
The war against Zionism and Israel’s “racist doctrine and logic of expansion through 
brutality and violence” was represented as the continuation of “mankind’s war against 
Fascism and Nazism.”120 However, Egypt as “a rational seeker of peace and a supporter 
of détente”121 clearly stated its desire to bring all parties to the conflict to the negotiating 
table. This dialog with the “enemy” was possible under the well-known conditions of 
Israel’s withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967 and its respect for the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people. Hence, peace, which seized to be a mere antonym to the 
state of war, acquired new semantic dimensions that rested on notions of dignity, respect, 
equality, security, and so forth. The oxymoron “peace with the enemy” thus became 
possible.  
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 This dialectic tone was also typical for the utterances about Colonialism and 
Imperialism. Both notions along with Zionism were placed in the same semantic category 
and described the policies of Israel and the United States, which supplied Israel with 
weapons “without restrictions and conditions.”122Although the same set of epithets was 
applied to the United States as to Israel (e.g., powerful, mighty and tyrannical)123 in 1972, 
a year later Sadat expressed his disappointment with the irrationality of the unconditional 
support that America was rendering Israel during the 1973 war:  
This is regrettable that this should be the attitude of one of the super 
powers in this age…Where to, when we and not Israel form the greater 
part of the Middle East; where to when all your interests all your interests 
are linked with us and not with Israel?124 
 
 Hence, a more sound relationship with the major supporter of the “enemy” was 
possible and even desirable in the context of détente and with the goal of the preservation 
of peace. Later, commenting on the personality of President Carter and the fruitful 
cooperation between the two leaders in their quest for peace, Sadat said: “President 
Carter is true to himself and true to others. I find that I am dealing with a man who 
understands what I want, a man impelled by the power of religious faith and lofty values 
– a farmer like me.”125 This rhetoric of trust and partnership contrasted the earlier tropes 
of mistrust and suspicion and represented a major departure from the revolutionary 
pathos, where the emphases were placed clearly.   
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 During 1974-1976 the discourse about Israel, Zionism and Imperialism became 
more complex, and the binary oppositions that persisted earlier began to attenuate and 
eventually became less prominent. First, a more nuanced approach toward the creation 
and the projection of the image of Israel was undertaken, so that the perception of Israel 
as a black box began to wane. The notion of Jews was divorced from Zionism and the 
coexistence between Arabs and Jews in the past was emphasized:  
The history of the Jews indicates…that they never felt as secure, tranquil 
and at peace – both individually and collectively – as they did under the 
wing of the Islamic nation…you can then imagine the amount of bitterness 
and pain we felt when a political movement arose under the slogan of 
Zionism…[April 21, 1974]126 
The Egyptian economy…was in Jewish hands until 1951, and even after. 
We never complained about it for we coexisted with each other. But 
problem of Zionism altered all that… [October 27, 1975]127 
 
This coincided with the introduction of the “peace” trope and its incorporation into 
Egyptian political course.  
 Second, the representation of the imperial powers – the United States and the 
Soviet Union – and the rhetoric about them became less emotionally charged and less 
incriminating. Egypt’s rapprochement with the pro-Western Gulf states, which were the 
main allies of America in the Arab Middle East, the necessity for injections of US 
financial aid into the Egyptian economy and moves toward peace under the auspices of 
the United States made for certain corrections to the official discourse. Colonialism was 
attributed to Zionism only, and the superpowers became viewed as allies and supporters 
of Egypt in its “struggle for peace” in the region: 
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As for the two superpowers and other influential responsible states and 
international blocks…our hands are stretched towards one and all 
unconditionally, provided they show understanding of our reality and 
respect our national will.128 
 
 During his speech at the National Press Club on his arrival in the United States, 
Sadat appealed to the American people, which definitely made his address very personal 
and indicated a major transformation in the official discourse. He said: “I need your 
support and cooperation”… in making the Middle East a place “regulated by peace and 
permeated by a spirit of hope and good will.”129 
 From 1977 until 1981 the inconsistencies in the representation of the “enemy” 
became even stronger. Israel was portrayed on the one hand as irrational and 
unpredictable – “Let Israel indulge in fits of hysterics as it pleases”130 –and at the same 
time a party to the peace negotiations, in which Sadat was ready to compromise: “I am 
even ready to go to the Knesset and discuss with them.”131 Israel was even credited with 
earlier attempts to establish peace with the Arab world that had remained unsatisfied: 
“For 25 years, they were calling for peace before the whole world, while we were saying 
no to their appeal; but today the opposite is true.”132 In his famous speech to the Knesset 
on November 20, 1977 Sadat addressed the members of the Israeli Parliament “with open 
mind and heart, and with a conscious free will.” The “psychological barrier” that Sadat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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sought to overcome could exist only between equals, between rational and mature parties 
to the conflict and only by mutual efforts toward an understanding that perpetual peace 
could be achieved. This elevation of Israel as an equal and rational partner in the peace 
treaty was unprecedented in the official Egyptian discourse. The Knesset speech was 
imbued with various symbolic tropes that have been analyzed by Norma Salem-Babikian. 
The most interesting in this context is the evolution of the concept of peace, which 
acquired both religious (the concepts of ‘adl, salam, Allah, insan and the coincidence of 
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem with ‘id al-adha, etc.)133 and secular dimensions (e.g., equality 
of nations before the international law, self-determination, etc.). In his address to the 
People’s Assembly he talks about “responsible Israelis,” who were able to adopt a 
civilized way of tackling the corrosive Arab-Israeli conflict.134 This image of Israel 
remained more or less intact until 1981. The recurring trope of peace (salam) as a 
condition for security (amn) and safety (aman), as the ultimate goal and the only 
condition for the sound and progressive development of both countries and the broader 
Middle East, peace almost as a providential and inevitable event, a sacrifice, a destiny, a 
burden and relief persisted until Sadat’s assassination. 
  
 State and Society – the Development of the Main Tropes 
 The central concepts regarding the state and its nature, which were developed 
over time in Sadat’s discourse, were freedoms, the rule of law, and the state of 
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institutions. A new responsible government and a responsible leader, a father figure, a 
hero, a far-sighted sage, a shrewd politician and a sovereign, who represented “the will of 
the nation,” emerged as new tropes and figures of speech in the official discourse.  
 The first step on the way to establish “democracy” was the liquidation of the 
“centers of power” (marakiz al-quwwa) and the establishing of Sadat’s political authority. 
Although Sadat severely criticized and eventually marginalized his political opponents, 
those who “tried to inherit the mantle of Nasser by imposing their will on the people by 
force,”135 the figure of Nasser and his contribution had remained undisputable throughout 
1971 and 1972. In his speeches commemorating the death of the leader, Sadat referred to 
Nasser as “the most valued hero,” “more eternal than words,” “fighter for liberties, rights, 
justice and unity of the Arab people,” and so forth.136 After the October War Sadat 
stepped out of Nasser’s shadow and began to claim that he played a pivotal role in 
shaping his legacy: “I participated with Gamal Abdel Nasser in the process of re-
constructing the Armed Forces. It was then my destiny to bear the responsibility of 
carrying on this build-up and assuming their Supreme Command (my italics).”137 With 
the de-Nasserization campaign the criticism of Nasser’s policies, but not of the za‘im 
himself, became more pronounced. Implicitly and sometimes overtly Sadat exposed the 
mistakes of the previous regime: “Our Armed Forces are no longer an arena for 
conflicting interests nor a means for achieving political and personal aims. They have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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been purified by the glorious October War.”138 These mistakes had to be “corrected” 
through the establishment of a qualitatively different system: 
We have transported…Egyptian reality from a state of revolutionary 
legitimacy to a state of constitutional legitimacy. Class struggle based on 
hatred and social separation has been replaced by social security and 
peace. Together we abolished all exceptional procedures adopted by the 
Revolution…139  
 
 Sadat asserted himself as an unquestionable leader, responsible and willing to 
sacrifice for the country’s progressive development: “I have talked to you about my 
sufferings ever since I assumed power; stiffing my passion, dealing with hardships, and 
preparing everything for the battle without having the right to reveal and explain 
everything.”140  How did Sadat envisage this new system? First, he proclaimed his desire 
to introduce and nourish various freedoms: “I want freedom of the press;”141 “There is no 
need, nor justification for expressing our opinions through clandestine means or outside 
the framework of institutions;”142 “I want security for the people. There will be no more 
espionage and tracking down people’s private lives,”143 and so on. The demonstrations 
that broke out on university campuses in 1973 and the secular and religious opposition to 
Sadat’s postwar policies, which waxed and waned at different times, led to the 
reformulation of some definitions: “Freedom of thought is a constant quality within 
man…however, ideas must conform to…the principles and values of society”144 and 
“some elements failed to comprehend their role within the new structure… they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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collapsed.”145 These freedoms were not absolute and could be implemented with certain 
reservations: “If freedom of expression is sacred, Egypt is more sacred and I am not 
prepared to relinquish any of her rights.”146  
 According to Sadat, the state of institutions and the supremacy of law had to be 
implemented in order to “determine a framework for democratic conduct…between our 
institutions, the state and the people.”147 As the president argued, a modern state of 
“science and faith” had to be built on the sacred institution of an independent judiciary, 
functioning in the name of the people and the constitution, based on “noble and tolerant 
values.”148 Mechanisms of “control and surveillance of all the government bodies”149 
would allow power to emanate from the people. Modernism, as Sadat argued in his 
October Paper, is “knowing the right order of priorities.”150 In the modern state people 
would be able to “realize their self-fulfillment and develop their creative capacities”151 
with the help of institutions and the systems that would produce “a suitable environment 
for development and creativeness.”152 The society would be founded on faith, which 
generally implied an Islamic moral life-style and adherence to ethical values. Faith had to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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be “free from fanaticism and impurity”153 and to encourage learning and progress. In 
1976 Sadat announced the introduction of a multiparty system, which very soon proved 
to be “flawed.” According to Sadat, in a modern state the opposition was expected to be 
“genuine and constructive”154 and nobody should be allowed to take advantage of 
“freedoms and democracy.” Not unexpectedly, Sadat’s utopian postulates about the state 
and the organization of society were bitterly contested in the discourse of the radical 
Islamists.   
 How did Sadat view an Egyptian citizen or society and the nation as a whole? In 
his speeches the themes of social unity, cohesion and social peace figured frequently and 
were especially noticeable after the 1973 War. These tropes were embodied into the 
newly coined term “the alliance of the working forces of the people,” whose effort is 
directed at the “democratic experiment,” by which he meant his version of the socialist 
solution.155 The “participation of all in a constructive and democratic dialog by means of 
their popular representatives”156 was crucial in these progressive endeavors. Egypt was 
depicted as a part of “a single and indivisible Arab nation,” but civilizationally and 
historically unique.157 Egypt would become a “producer society,” drawing inspiration 
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from the infitah policy, soundly functioning with “effective and simplified laws” and 
social guarantees such as jobs and health care.158  
 This brief account of the most visible fluctuations in the official discourse 
illustrates major inconsistencies within it. It is progressive in its declarations about the 
democratic nature of state institutions, the rule of law, public participation in politics and 
individual rights and freedoms while simultaneously both authoritarian in its 
emasculating definitions of these rights and freedoms and repressive in its enframing of 
reality. The official discourse represents the agenda of a single individual that is often 
incoherent and filled with contradictions. Contrary to the widespread view that discourse 
reflects and acts upon reality, this analysis shows visible inconsistencies between reality 
and rhetoric. The discourse addressed a different political reality, which had no 
connection to the real one, and of course failed to create the reality that Sadat envisioned 
for Egypt. This gap provided space for alternative discourses to emerge and take hold.  
 
Counter-Discourse of al-Jihad 
 The second half of this chapter identifies and analyzes the major themes that 
informed the discourse of the radical Islamist groups, particularly al-Jihad, and its 
relation to the dominant narrative created by the government. The main text that this 
analysis is based upon is called the Neglected Duty (al-Farida al-Gha’iba) by the lay 
intellectual and ideological inspiration of al-Jihad Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj 
(1954-1982). Like a distorted mirror, this work reflects the issues and tropes developed in 
the official discourse of the Sadat era. This half of the chapter discusses the central 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Ibid., 14-16. 
$+!
themes elaborated in this counter-discourse, namely, the state and its internal 
organization; the society and its nature; war and peace; Israel and imperialism. The 
analysis shows that while these discourses differ in their systems of representation, they 
remain relatively similar in their structure159 and are both exclusive and repressive in 
their definitions and strategies.160 These discourses were created and utilized by a 
particular political actor (s) in their struggle for resources, but both failed to address the 
issues of the socio-historical reality in which they were constructed.  Neither found a 
wide audience and neither became a leading force in the future political developments in 
Egypt.  
 
The State and Society 
 In contrast to Sadat’s state of institutions, the state envisioned by Faraj was an 
Islamic state (al-dawla al-Islamiya) and the Caliphate (al-Khilafa), which had to be 
restored. The establishment of these two political entities and the rule of God (iqamat 
hukm Allah ‘ala hadhihi al-ard) are considered a primary goal of al-Jihad movement and 
a duty for every Muslim (al-qital alaan fard ‘ala kulli muslim). Faraj argues: “if the 
Islamic state cannot be established except by fighting, then we must resort to fighting 
(yajib ‘alayna al-qital)”161 and those who abandon the path of Jihad would be punished 
(see ‘uqubat tark al-jihad). In this connection he emphasizes that jihad in the path of 
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Allah is the only way to “return and raise the monument of Islam” (‘awda wa raf‘ sarh 
al-Islam) and to overthrow the “tyrants of this earth with the force of the sword” 
(tawaghit hadhihi-‘l-ard lan tazul illa bi-quwwat al-sayf).162 The answer to the central 
question that Faraj asks the readers - Do we live in an Islamic State? (Hal nahnu na‘ish 
f’il-dawla al-islamiya?) – has of course to be negative, which implies that the ruler of this 
dar al-kufr cannot be considered a Muslim,163 but represents an apostate (hakim bi-ghayr 
ma anzala allah).164 Such a portrayal of Sadat as an apostate tyrant (fi ridda ‘an al-Islam) 
posed a challenge to the discursive “authority” of such tropes as al-Ra’is al-Mu’min, the 
Believer-President, or the Hero of Peace, that the president attempted to promote.165  
 In his speeches Sadat often addressed the glorious army as one of the central 
institutions of the Egyptian society. As he indicated, the main role of the army is to 
“defend the homeland, its dignity and reputation along with defending the Constitution 
which is the source of legitimacy in this country.”166 Faraj, in contrast, talks about the 
establishment of a Muslim Army (tandhim al-jaysh al-muslim), whose duty is to fight (al-
qital) the enemy. He develops an entire ritual around the duty of jihad, which includes 
the application of a certain method of fighting (uslub al-qital) and the chanting of special 
prayers (al-da‘wa qabla al-qital), and he considers various problematic matters around it, 
such as lying (al-kidhb), cooperation with the infidels (al-isti‘ana bi-mushrik), and such. 
This discourse is aimed at the creation of an “enclave” society with its own institutions (a 
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believing minority, a Muslim army, etc.), whose language, norms and laws are distinct 
from the ones in the outer society of jahiliya. Such militant language became a channel 
through which “the petite bourgeoisie and lower classes expressed not only their 
resentment of corruption, decadence and inequality, but also their hostility towards the 
very state machine that embodied these evils.”167  
 The rule of (the secular) law, which became Sadat’s mantra, was equated to the 
Mongol Yassa (al-yasaq),168 and juxtaposed to the sovereignty of the Law reviled by God 
(shari‘ Allah). All the institutions in the “apostate state,” including the benevolent 
societies (jam‘iyat khayriya) and the various brotherhoods, are placed under the 
jurisdiction of the secular law; hence, they are considered a part of a jahili system and 
thus prohibited by Faraj. According to the leader of al-Jihad, the laws that Sadat sought 
to establish are the products of Imperialism (al-isti‘amar) and cooperation with “the 
Crusaders, Communists and Zionists.”169 In Faraj’s cognitive map there can be only two 
forms of state rule: al-Hakimiya (hukm allah or government from/guided by God170) and 
al-Jahiliya (state of ignorance before the advent of Islam; un-Islamic governance). al-
Hakimiya represents “the unity of divine Sovereignty and temporal authority with the 
implied notion that the latter stems from the former.”171 al-Jahiliya describes Sadat’s 
government, where he deems himself an unquestionable sovereign, and is used to 
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denounce the society as a whole.172 In this context Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, a 
mufti of the al-Jihad group, reminds the readers of his book a Word of Truth (Kalimat 
Haqq) that there is one creator (al-khaliq wahid) and one king (al-malik wahid, my 
italics) and that is Allah. He laments the fact that ungodly law and government (shar‘iyat 
al-jahiliya wa hukm al-jahiliya) has been substituted for God’s Law, and that popular 
sovereignty (jil min al-bashar) has been placed above the rule of God (fawq hukm 
Allah).173 The elaborations on the nature of governance that Faraj presents to the reading 
public are underpinned by quotations from Ibn Taymiyyah (Bab al-Jihad) and Ibn Kathir, 
which reflect the narration style of Shaykh ‘Umar. The “Blind Shaykh’s” a Word of Truth 
(Kalimat Haqq) is almost entirely based on references to the medieval religious 
authorities with little commentary from the author. As Salwa Ismail has argued, this is 
done in order to “endow the commentary with a higher authority and a special status in 
the discourse of the truth (my italics).”174 It is interesting to note that while such style is 
typical of Shaykh ‘Umar, it is rather unusual for the new “intellectuals,” who in the 
words of Shaykh himself frequently “do not remember the Quran, do not know the rules 
of grammar, and are often mistaken even in the names of the books on which they base 
their arguments.”175   
 Sadat’s state based on science and faith also found an equivalent in the discourse 
of Faraj. Thus, the quest for learning (the first component of Sadat’s equation, and talab 
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al-‘ilm in Faraj’s vocabulary) is not sufficient to establish an Islamic state.176 And by 
faith alone, which is usually expressed in proselytism (al-da‘wa), the formation of a 
broad support base (qa‘ida ‘arida) and praying (dhikr Allah) or through practicing hijra, 
the “prison-state” will not be destroyed.177 Through waging jihad, which is considered the 
height of worship (qimmat al-‘ibada al-fa‘aliya), a believing minority (al-qilla al-
mu’mina) is capable of implementing the Islamic state project. This postulate contradicts 
Sadat’s rhetoric regarding the “participation of all” and the “alliance of the working 
forces.” For Faraj religion implies obedience and submission (al-din huwa al-ta‘a) and 
not a life-style or an inspiring force that Sadat described in his speeches. Reminiscing 
Sayyid Qutb, who announced “la budd li’l-islam an yahkam” (it is inevitably that Islam 
will rule), Faraj calls for jihad, which is necessary in order to restore a complete authority 
of God over the religion.  
 As for the organization of the society, Faraj claims that the relationship between 
the ruler, who is the best Muslim (ahsan islaman) and the strongest of all (al-aqwa),178 
and the society (of Muslims rather than citizens) is to be based on obedience to the 
leader, expressed in the oath until death (bai‘ya ‘ala al-mawt).179 It is clear from the text 
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that the hierarchy of authority in this enclave “society of warriors” is derived from their 
particular understanding or the imagining of the Prophet’s life and his relationship with 
the community of believers. However, the mechanism for the selection of the leader is 
not discussed in the text; it is not clear whether the leader is simply primus inter pares 
among the few believers (al-qilla al-mu’mina), and the form that the relationships 
between the leader and the followers will take in the framework of a modern state 
remains unclear.   
 
Israel, Zionism and Imperialism  
 Israel as a political entity is almost absent in the discourse of al-Jihad, and 
Zionism and Imperialism did not figure as frequently in the vocabulary of the movement 
as in the official discourse. A short and direct passage of al-Farida entitled “The Far 
Enemy and the Close Enemy” explains why the liberation of Palestine – a trope so 
regularly repeated in Sadat’s speeches – is not urgent in current circumstances and that 
priority should be given to the elimination or the fighting of the “Close Enemy,” that is 
the Egyptian government and the “regime of the Pharaoh” (qital al-‘adou al-qarib ula 
min qital al-‘adou al-ba‘id).180 Faraj argues: 
The blood of the Muslims will be spilled even if (hatta wa inn) a victory is 
achieved. Is this victory achieved in the interest (li-salih) of the Islamic state 
or for the interest of the apostate rule (al-hukm al-kafir)? …We need to 
focus on our Islamic goal (qadiyatna al-islamiya) which is the establishment 
of the Law of God (shar’ Allah) in our country first.181 
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The existence of imperialist entities in the heart of Muslim land is “due to the leaders 
Farida wants to be removed.”182 Imperialism (istibdad or isti‘amar) provided the fertile 
ground upon which the hated regime thrived. Laws based on the alien values of 
modernism, secularism, freedoms and so on informed the policies of an “authoritarian-
modernizing state”183 and sustained the “apostate regime.” Faraj believes that Jerusalem 
will be re-conquered once the rule of God is established in every Muslim country.  
 Hence, in opposition to the recurring theme of peace invoked by Sadat, the 
narrative of Faraj is constructed around the notion of jihad. It is a narrative of 
confrontation with the Other, that is, the apostate state. The enemy here is void of 
nuances and complexities, while the image of the enemy in the official discourse 
becomes transformed into a party to the peace treaty. Behind these major differences 
stand the opposing systems of values, around which both discourses are constructed. Both 
of them claimed to represent the truth and sought change based on continuity: Sadat 
referred to the new achievements and the 7000 year history of Egypt; Faraj invoked the 
authority of the medieval ‘ulama and the history of Islam as “a tool of validation”184 and 
depicted the true Islamic state built on the blood of mujahidin. As the analysis has shown, 
both discourses tried to address the problématique of the century in its domestic and 
international dimensions. For Sadat it was the modernization of Egyptian society and a 
just peace in the Middle East. For the radical Islamists it was the annihilation of the 
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jahiliya embodied by the ruling regime and the recreation of an invented Golden Age of 
Islam in a contemporary context. Despite obvious contrasts, both discourses share certain 
similarities. They claim to be universalizing discourses that produce totalizing categories 
(e.g., citizen, Muslim, etc.),185 and strive to structure and dominate the political field. 
However, both failed to resonate within the larger audience, with which they sought to 
engage. It is interesting to note that almost none of the projects initiated by Sadat were 
carried over to the Mubarak era.186 Radical Islamist discourse proved almost equally 
barren and did not initiate any significant socio-political transformations apart from 
scattered eruptions of violence in the 1990s.  
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1972-1981: DISCURSIVE SHIFT IN COMMEMORATIVE PRACTICES  
AND SYMBOLS IN EGYPT 
 
Each age refashions its discourse to serve new causes187 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 Semiotic practices 188 that include spectacles, iconography and some verbal modes 
of expression189 represent constitutive parts of any political discourse. Understood as 
texts, these practices illustrate how “people use words, establish and interpret signs and 
act in the world in ways that foster intelligibility.”190 Various forms through which 
significant historical events are commemorated serve as reservoirs of meanings. They 
reveal tropes and themes that dominate in particular political epochs and elucidate the 
evolution of meanings invested in these practices over time. Political spectacles are the 
modes of communication between the “audience” and the “producer.” They promote 
images and symbols, which frame political thinking, convey political messages to the  
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participants, and anchor “visually and audibly politically significant ideas and self-
conceptions.191 
In some way, every state is a theatre state, whose performances are “pointed 
towards spectacle, ceremony, and public dramatization.”192 Especially conspicuous are 
the ceremonies in authoritarian states, where the heroic ethos is celebrated through 
spectacles and performances. Thus, military parades on the Red Square or demonstrations 
in the Soviet Union served as a form of patriotic affirmation,193 the glorification of the 
homeland and the manifestation of the nation’s invincibility. The monumental 
architecture and grandiose military parades of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy served as 
part of an effective propaganda machine, projected state power and conveyed a particular 
vision of history, culture, identity, modernity and the future. Spectacles in the form of 
military processions, ceremonial presidential addresses, festive iconography and so forth 
became especially salient in Egypt after the Free Officers’ Revolution of 1952 and 
throughout the Nasser era. Later, the celebrations of the July Revolution and the 
laudation of the za‘im (leader) were eclipsed by parades commemorating the victory in 
the October War and extolling President Sadat’s personal contribution.194   
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 When spectacles become the medium of communication and social control, public 
space becomes transformed into a “representational battleground, where many different 
social groups fight for access and fight for control of the images that define them.”195 
Commemorative objects, ceremonies, and texts become fields of contestation between 
various groups. According to Gershoni and Jankowski, “Opposition groups shape 
subversive counter-narratives of commemoration to challenge prevailing master 
narratives shaped by dominant groups.”196 In an authoritarian state, where the totality of 
state power is salient and the state is the main locus of authority, the regime 
“monopolizes public spaces” 197  through commemorative performances and bestows 
meanings on these performances, alters them and withdraws them, in order to serve the 
regime’s best interests. The “audience” may agree with these meanings and 
interpretations or, as Lisa Wedeen has illustrated for Syria, it may not. In such states 
public discussions are restricted by censorship; hence, counter-discourses are expressed 
in private spaces and through different practices.198   
 Although some political philosophers juxtapose “public” and “private” 
(Habermas), “public” here is not defined in opposition to “private.” In a modern state the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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line between “public” and “private” is often blurred. The understanding of “public” used 
in this paper is analogous to the one elaborated by Elizabeth Thompson, who defines the 
term as follows: “public space embraces areas in the physical environment, where city 
residents encounter fellow members of their urban community. It also indicates a 
metaphysical kind of shared and anonymous space, as in communities imagined in the 
press.”199 It can be argued that at a certain point in time (1974-1977) all social groups200 
in Egypt more or less agreed upon the interpretation of the October victory, the meanings 
that surrounded it and its centrality to modern Egyptian history. However, not all of 
them201 supported and agreed upon the way in which the meanings invested in the event 
evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Public space, in both physical and virtual 
senses, was dominated and permeated by the state. Therefore alternative discourses 
occurred in the private domain, which remained private both physically and 
ideologically.202 At the same time, these private spaces were public in a sense that they 
were open to anyone who chose to enter them, and that open and public debates took 
place there.203 As many theorists of social movements and mass mobilization and 
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contention argue, “Under authoritarian rule, the masses lack formal political access to 
mitigate the adverse effects of modernization projects and the deterioration of quality of 
life. With few open channels for political recourse, the result is societal frustration and 
sense of alienation.” 204  Therefore religion, which is imbued with symbolism and 
practices, becomes a mobilizing and organizing ideology. These initially religious 
symbols and practices acquire a new “socio-political” dimension and translate particular 
messages and create counter-narratives.  
 This chapter will address the official commemoration practices and the 
transformation they underwent over time and will analyze the performative practices 
adopted by the radical Islamists. They projected a counter-discourse and different 
messages and symbols were pertinent to them.   
 
Official Commemorations of the October Victory and  
the Discursive Shifts in Commemorative Practices 
Valorization of the Victory and the Soldier 
 The Ramadan War quickly became a central event in the Egyptian historical 
imagination and was widely commemorated at all levels of Egyptian society. It even 
eclipsed the “traditional” celebrations of the July Revolution. It was an event that restored 
the pride and dignity (al-‘izza wa’l-karama) of the Egyptians and the larger Arab world 
after the set back (al-naksa) of 1967 and inspired new projects in different fields. The war 
bestowed a new legitimacy on President Sadat and granted him the title of the “Hero of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the War and of the Crossing” (batal al-harb wa’l-‘ubur). It became a reservoir of 
meanings that fluctuated over time depending on the international, regional and domestic 
contexts. 
 New holidays, ceremonial performances, and iconography were introduced to 
commemorate the “victory,” intended to demonstrate the competence of the Arab armies 
and the solidarity of the Arab states in their defeat of the enemy. National pride in skillful 
leadership, the bravery of the soldiers, and the endurance of the Arab (Egyptian) people, 
and the strength of Arab weapons became the primary focus of the commemorations and 
were juxtaposed with the humiliation of the Israelis. This was the main emphasis of the 
celebrations during the first two years and reflected the new balance of power in the 
region.  
 The Day of the Crossing (5 October – 9 October) and the Lifting of the Israeli 
siege of the City of Suez (24 October) have become important fixtures in the Egyptian 
holiday calendar since 1974. Mass festive activities began with official visits to the 
cemeteries on 5 October. Cemeteries and the graves of the soldiers represent a part of the 
“spatial-historical system”205 of the memorialization of a war and create continuity in 
time between the past and the present. The contribution and sacrifices of the soldiers 
were commemorated during the military parade in Nasr City and visits to the hospitals, 
where wounded servicemen were honored. Praise for the Egyptian armed forces 
manifested itself in the display of captured Israeli (American) weaponry and vehicles and 
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photographs of Israeli prisoners of war, who were portrayed as weak and vulnerable. 206 
Young graduates were feted by the Military Academy on 9 October, and sporting events 
and cultural activities organized by the Ministry of Culture attracted thousands of 
spectators. Various textual and audiovisual depictions of the Egyptian armed forces 
crossing the Canal were introduced and served as a “metaphor for the awakening of the 
Egyptian society from the gloom that swept it in its entirety after Egypt’s crushing defeat 
in the 1967 war.”207 The feeling of elation coupled with the elegy over the fallen soldiers 
is skillfully illustrated in Yusuf al-Qa’id’s novel “War in the Land of Egypt” (al-Harb fi 
bar Misr), where a narrator-soldier is sitting near the coffin of his fatally wounded 
comrade Misri and exclaims: 
It is a sad, depressing scene I have to relate, whereas you people in the land 
of Egypt are living in times of victory, happy laughter and boundless joy. 
You are a happy people, happier than our forefathers ever were and happier 
than our grandchildren will be.208 
 
 The soldiers who made the supreme sacrifice were immortalized in stone. The 
monument to the Unknown Soldier was inaugurated in October 1975. It is a hollow 
pyramid, a symbol of Egypt’s pharaonic heritage, with the Soldier’s tomb as a black cube 
placed inside the pyramid. Seventy-one names of the martyrs (shuhada’) both Muslim 
and Christian (Coptic) are engraved on its walls. The platform, which overlooks the 
monument and the road for military parades, is embellished with a bronze eagle, which 
represents Republican Egypt. Pharaonic, nationalist and religious symbols and references 
were brought together and emphasized the continuity of the state and celebrate its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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achievements and its might. As Meital argues, the monument represents the national 
effort to “unify diverse social, communal, and religious groups into a single abstract 
citizen.”209 Important speeches were pronounced at this site, wreaths were laid and the 
prayers chanted at the Soldier’s tomb. Pupils made an obligatory field trip to the Madinat 
Nasr neighborhood of Cairo to visit the memorial and learn about the war. This 
ceremonial and education event, which became part of the national education system (al-
tarbiya al-wataniya) institutionalized meanings, symbols and messages, engraved in a 
multidimensional pattern of national commemoration.210  
 The practice of memorialization and commemoration of the war through naming 
became widespread. Thus, a new city, named the Sixth of October (Madinat al-Sadis min 
Uktubar) was founded and a bridge over the Nile in Cairo was given the same name. 
Names are related to particular sites or, to use Pierre Nora’s notion, Les Lieux de 
Mémoire. These spaces are connected to “moments of memory” or “single key moments 
in which a total revision of the connection to the past was crystallized in an individual or 
collective work.”211 These sites of memory named in a particular way were characterized 
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by “three senses of the word – material, symbolic and functional – that are created by the 
interplay of history and memory.”212 Naming as a meaning-making practice creates 
“collective cultural and public memories,”213 shapes national imagination and reveals 
narratives formed by the government, which seeks to institutionalize a particular memory 
and a particular set of meanings connected to it. In an authoritarian state, it is the regime 
that possesses the right to give names and to impart meanings to these names. The label 
of “6 October” is an extended metaphor that brings about a series of associations, all 
shaped and encouraged by the government.  
 During the first years of commemoration, the victory was represented as a 
glorious outcome of Arab cooperation with a multidimensional significance: on the 
military level it had reaffirmed the competence of the Arab soldier; while on the domestic 
level it had restored Egyptian self-confidence; “regionally it had demonstrated the 
effectiveness of Arab unity; and globally it had placed the Arab and Palestinian causes on 
the world agenda.”214  
 Another trope that the regime sought to promote through various performative 
practices was that of redemption and purification: the victory erased the defeat in the Six 
Day War and thus redeemed the Arabs from the woeful memories of national humiliation 
and loss. Hence on 5 June 1975, which had brought about painful associations with al-
naksa, President Sadat announced his intention to reconstruct the cities in the Suez Canal 
Zone that had been destroyed during the military conflict. On 5 June 1976 the Canal was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reopened for shipping. Wearing a white admiral’s uniform, Sadat attended the ceremony, 
which was followed by a military parade in Port Said. The president proceeded down the 
Canal on the naval destroyer “October 6.”215 Thus, the recollections of the 1967 defeat 
were overshadowed by the new military achievements, which brought national liberation 
and the leadership into the focus of victory.   
 These themes that were transformed later and were embodied in Egyptian 
iconography, represent a fascinating example of how images transform over time 
according to the fluctuation of the political context and also how political satire became a 
convenient filter through which this shift was expressed. Thus, before and during the war 
political cartoonists depicted Israel as a bald one-eyed criminal who had been terrorizing 
the world. This creature represented the IDF as bloodthirsty and inherently violent. 
Sometimes Israel was portrayed as Golda Meir. Her dresses were short, unattractively 
revealing her naked legs, her appearance repulsive and imbued with masculine features. 
She was shown as a leader, as she was driving the car, where the American president was 
a back-seat driver. She was closing his eyes and mouth, persuading him to follow her 
course.216 The international community, depicted as a doubtful and indecisive American 
president (Nixon), or a globe that resembled the hairless head of pirate-Israel, or the 
United Nations building sinking in the ocean, was another character in these cartoons. 
Egypt was portrayed as a middle-aged woman, bidding farewell to her soldier sons.217 It 
is clear that satirical forms of graphic expression underwent some changes once the 
rapprochement took place between Israel and Egypt on the one hand and Egypt and the 
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United States on the other.  For instance, some political cartoons showed Israel as a short 
old man with sharp teeth, typical Semitic features and a Star of David placed on his bald 
head. The image of Israel still remained unappealing and dehumanizing, but it showed 
some shift in the perception.218 The image of Israel now became more human, a person 
dressed in civilian clothes giving press conferences and talks.219   
 
1975-1978 – “Other” Crossing 
 After the first anniversary of the Crossing (1974) the glorious victory acquired 
new meanings and interpretations. They found their expression in metaphors attached to 
festive activities, monuments, and textual and audiovisual projects. The attempts of the 
regime to nationalize and unify the memory of the great historical event and channel 
discussions around it were salient. Thus, the Monument of Martyrs, honoring the 
casualties of war, was unveiled in 1975 and the Arches of Victory were constructed along 
the Suez Canal during 1976. Seven sculptures, representing the long record of Egypt’s 
military victories over its enemies from the Pharaoh Ramses II to the October war, were 
erected in 1976.220  Commemoration of war casualties and the celebration of the victory 
coincided with the introduction of Sadat’s infitah project, the opening of the Egyptian 
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economy to the West and broad changes in Egyptian foreign policy. The meanings 
surrounding al-‘ubur were translated into a new socio-economic dimension, which had to 
be engraved in various commemorative practices.  For instance, 1976 witnessed the 
opening of a rail link between Port Said and Isma‘iliyya, and in 1977 a tunnel was built 
under the Suez Canal. The “military crossing” became transformed into a “civilian 
crossing” that reflected itself in various civilian projects directed at socio-economic 
modernization and the reconstruction of the Sinai. The presentation of these “civil” 
achievements coincided with the glorious day of victory and became in a sense an 
invented tradition. As Eric Hobsbawm argues, “Inventing traditions is essentially a 
process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only 
by imposing repetition.”221 This process of creating rituals and symbolic complexes 
occurs “when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand and the supply 
side.”222  
 The expansion of meaning was depicted also in a series of celebration stamps that 
had been issued every year since 1974. Yoram Meital describes different motives 
reflected in the stamp catalogue that reveal the discursive shift. Most of the stamps 
portray president Sadat in military uniform standing against the backdrop of a fluttering 
national flag and the commemorative slogans “Spark of Liberation” (shararat al-tahrir) 
and “October War 1973” (Harb Uktubar 1973).223 Instead of arms and armor the stamps 
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contain symbols of peaceful achievements (buildings, tractors, factories, etc.).224 Civilian 
achievements represented a continuation of the military victory under the wise guidance 
of the national leader. The image of Sadat was transformed from a military leader into a 
wise ruler, who had initiated significant changes for the country and the nation. The trope 
of “civilizational crossing,” peaceful achievements and the nation built on economic and 
scientific development permeates commemoration practices between 1975 and 1977. 
These themes in commemoration reflected various changes in domestic and foreign 
policies that Sadat initiated.225  
 
1978-1981 – the War as Prelude to Peace 
 Inevitably, the various steps on the way to a settlement with Israel and the peace 
negotiations with the former enemy under the auspices of the United States brought about 
a significant shift in the meanings attached to the war and victory. The War was 
represented as an important event on the road to peace with Israel, peace based on justice, 
the elimination of psychological barriers and the establishment of mutual trust. In 
harmony with this theme various construction projects manifested peaceful developments !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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prison or critiques of Nasser’s military leadership and authoritarian rule during the Six 
Day War. Every action undertaken by Sadat during the interim of 1975-1978 was 
intended to underline the liberation and renovation of Egypt. 
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and progress in Egypt. Thus, in 1979 the new Egyptian National Library and Museum 
were opened to the public, and during the same year a new medical center, schools and 
bus station were opened.226 Upon the initiative of President Sadat a new suburb of Cairo, 
named the City of Peace (Madinat al-Salam), was built, which made some contribution to 
the solution of the problem of overcrowding and overpopulation in Cairo. 227 The 
understanding of the October victory as an all-Arab achievement was replaced by a more 
Egypt-centered discourse. The victory was nationalized and portrayed as an Egyptian 
achievement, while Syria’s role was severely marginalized. This occurred against a 
backdrop of widespread Arab (and domestic) disapproval of the separate peace 
negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Political cartoons ridiculed the theme of Arab 
unity and depicted Arab leaders as obstinate and pragmatic, treacherous and lacking in 
political instinct (which ostracized Egypt supposedly possesses).228 
 The symbols of peace adorned school textbooks, newspapers and magazines and 
celebratory stamps. For example, the stamp issued after the Peace Treaty was signed in 
1979 depicted a white dove carrying an olive branch over the image of the Sinai 
Peninsula and the text “Peace Treaty” (Ittifaqiyat al-Salam) and “The sixth anniversary of 
the Crossing” (al-‘Ubur).229    
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The Counter-Discourse of the Radical Islamists  
in the Late 1970s (Practices) 
Islamists and Civil Society 
 The theme of the “public” is connected to the discussion of the “state” domain, 
just as the “private” is a part of the debate about “society.” As mentioned earlier, an 
authoritarian state does not only hold a “monopoly on violence,” but also possesses a 
monopoly on establishing and interpreting symbols through meaning-making practices. 
However, these symbols imbued with meanings do not exist in a vacuum, but are directed 
at an “audience,” which responds to and discusses them.   
  In most respects “the Egyptian government had wide administrative and legal 
powers, which gave its organs almost unlimited sway.”230 These powers allowed the 
government to initiate messages through texts and meaning-making practices. However, 
in the late 1970s “while retaining political power the existing regime ceded substantial 
control over the societal and cultural spheres to the revolutionary challenger,”231 that is, 
the Islamist groups, which promoted their own particular understanding of the historical 
trajectory of the country.232 Hence, the alternative interpretations were discussed in the 
private domain, on the societal level.  
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 Civil society in every state is not homogeneous. It is represented by voluntary 
associations (de Tocqueville, Saad Eddin Ibrahim), which can be autonomous from, or in 
some extent dependent on, the state and enjoy different degrees of formality and 
power.233 Civil society can be defined as an informal network of relationships (Tariq al-
Bishri) of a liberal or illiberal, democratic or authoritarian nature. As much as civil 
society can promote democratic change, some of its elements can also lead to the 
isolation of the citizens from the state and promote “contending political programs that 
often resort to violence and repression.”234  
 The most notable counter-discourse(s) in Egypt in the 1970s in both textual and 
performative aspects was attributed to the Islamists, whose activities gained momentum 
as a result of the generally declining legitimacy and efficiency of the state.235 Islamist 
political trends (sing. tayyar al-Islam al-siyasi) were quite heterogeneous, represented 
both by the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood and the “more extreme” Jihad and the 
Takfir trends.236 The second part of this chapter will address the practices adopted by the 
radical Islamist organizations, because they reflect the most prominent and striking 
textual and performative counter-narratives. In this regard Ayubi has argued that the 
Islamist discourse embodies: 
A broad alternative system of meaning and power, to the hegemonic system 
represented by the existing socio-political order, which inevitably !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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marginalizes and/or alienates certain individuals and certain social groups… 
it is a very different thesis from that advocated by the State. The 'difference' 
itself seems to fulfill a certain function vis-à-vis an order that is deemed to 
be at most evil and corrupt, and at least a failure or a non-fulfilled 
promise.237 
 
 Although these radical groups emerged within Egyptian society, they represent its 
product rather than the society itself. Their discourse and practices engendered 
authoritarian and violent impulses in the “private” domain.238 These units of authority 
and communal organizations, represented by the Islamist groups, used existing social 
networks to permeate the socio-economic and cultural life of the society and take some 
functions of the state upon themselves. These organizations were exclusive, embraced 
authoritarian forms of internal management, and, as Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa‘id argues, 
did not represent “some sort of grassroots, “authentic” popular expressions.”239 While 
some of these groups interacted with members of society, other groups went as far as to 
excommunicate it and seek its destruction.240 Therefore, it would be incorrect to argue 
that radical Islamist discourse in the late 1970s – early 1980s in Egypt was a genuine 
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Practices as Locutors of Counter-Discourse   
 These polarized “layers of authority,” that is, the state and the radical groups, 
projected their interpretations and understandings of Egypt’s political trajectory on the 
society through texts and performative practices. Every message articulated by the state 
was bitterly opposed by the Islamists through their own risala, which was based on an 
evenly different system of meanings and symbols. Thus, President Sadat was promoting a 
glorious image of the Egyptian state built on “knowledge and faith,” and the multifaceted 
nature of this state rested on the rich heritage of the pharaonic, Islamic and nationalist 
symbols. A “Believer-President” was leading the community of citizens toward peace 
with their most vicious enemy. This image was contested by the Islamists, who detested 
the “prison-state”241 governed by the Pharaoh that had imposed on Egypt a shameful 
“pact with the Jews” under the “Crusader conspiracy.” The Jewish state, where Sadat 
went to seek peace, was labeled as dar al-harb. Egypt was not viewed as dar al-Islam or 
dar al-salam, for it was inhabited and governed by the people that endorsed the most 
detestable vices in the eyes of the Islamists – secularism, imperialism, and Zionism. The 
Egyptian society of infidels was juxtaposed to the community of Muslims, who wanted to 
build a true Islamic state on the ruins of jahiliya.  Such vision embodied a radically 
different Weltanschauung, which nullified any political move the president undertook. 
 As Max Weber argued, “ideas – religious, moral, practical, aesthetic – must be 
carried by powerful social groups; someone must revere them, celebrate them, defend 
them, impose them. They have to be institutionalized in order to find not just an 
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intellectual existence in society, but a material one as well.”242 One of the organizations 
whose institutionalized symbolic practices represented a vivid example of counter-
discourse was Takfir wa’l-Hijra (or Jama‘at al-Muslimin) that emerged on the political 
arena of Egypt in the 1960s and was headed by the agronomist Shukri Mustafa. The 
semiotic practices of this group were informed by the understanding that a jahiliya 
society had to be excommunicated. During “the phase of weakness” takfir could not be 
pronounced publicly, therefore the group had to withdraw from the rest of the society of 
unbelievers (mufasla kamila) and create a little Society of Muslims on its margins.243 
People of the cave (ahl al-kahf) were wandering in the mountains and living in the caves, 
practicing al-‘uzla (isolation), in some sense recreating the imagined experience of the 
Prophet Muhammad. Shukri gathered his disciples at his house – the only space he 
deemed appropriate for praying244 - and created his own community, isolated from the 
apostates and functioning according to a different set of rules and principles. There were 
only four mosques where prayer was allowed – al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, al-Masjid 
al-Aqsa in Jerusalem, and two Mosques in Medina (Masjadayn Qubba wa al-Nabawi). 
According to Shukri, a mosque could be called the mosque of God (masjid Allah) and, 
therefore, appropriate for praying only under three conditions. First, if the da‘wa there is 
“faithful to God alone” (khalisa li-allah wahduhu – my italics); if it is built according to 
the conditions and qualities mentioned by God (al-shurut aw al-awsaf allati dhakkaraha 
Allah; here Shukri cites Surat al-nur); and finally, if it is founded on piety (al-ta’ssis ‘ala 
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al-taqwa).245 It is obvious that the mosques built by the state, in which “state” ulama 
preached, could not meet any of Shukri’s requirements. Hence, attending Friday prayers 
was prohibited and serving the state was not allowed in this counter-society: the army, 
exalted in Sadat’s Egypt for its heroic achievements in 1973 was an institution of a 
jahiliya state, in which adepts of Takfir wa’l- hijra were not allowed to serve. Moreover, 
the glorified al-‘ubur that Sadat valorized was devaluated: Shukri declared at his trial that 
the war between the Arabs and the Jews could not be regarded as an Islamic struggle and 
the conquest of Palestine was useless, because it would not be ruled by the pious rulers 
according to the will of God.246 After discrediting mosques and the army as the 
institutions of a “prison-state,” the Islamists undermined Sadat’s initiative to open new 
universities and implement a new economic program. Shukri outlawed universities as 
mere instruments for the legitimation of the jahiliya state and the bastions of the “corrupt 
liberal thought” and he prohibited any sort of work that served the state and embraced the 
new economic ideology. Moreover, other social institutions, such as marriage, were 
brought into question. Members of the Society “were married within the group according 
to a special ritual and had children, thus assuring the survival of authentic Muslims.”247 
They lived with other members of the sect in furnished apartments, which were 
inaccessible to most Egyptians in a society that was sinking into the abyss of 
unemployment. Some members of the Society were sent to the Gulf countries, which 
represented a prototype of an external hijra (i.e., the flight of Muhammad to Medina in 
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622). While a large part of the income earned by the “muhajirun” was spent on the needs 
of the Society, Shukri procured wives for them. As Kepel describes,  
In their furnished rooms the Society’s members created a tiny, genuine 
Islamic society of their own based on their understanding of Islam. Here 
they married young, housing was immediately available, and the values of 
the Egyptian society no longer applied. Diplomas were considered mere 
scraps of paper, the mosques of the Ministry of Waqfs temples for worship 
of medieval annotators and Israel an enemy on the same footing as the 
iniquitous prince and his administrations.248 
 
 Other public places monopolized by the Islamic Associations (Jama‘at Islamiya) 
were university campuses. These were the spaces, where “regular daily prayers, 
ideological training, an apprenticeship in the skills of the preacher and the tactics of 
proselytism, socializing with the group, and more”249 took place. By providing minibuses 
and modest Islamic garments for female students, reproducing cheap study materials for 
the students, organizing study groups at the mosques where cadres for the Islamist 
organizations were recruited, and so forth, the Jama‘at criticized “the regime’s failure to 
deal effectively with education, housing, transport and inflation”250 and create the feeling 
of belonging and social affiliation. They promoted their own counter-narrative, imbued 
with symbols that resonated within the university milieu. For instance, another extremist 
organization, al-Jihad, organized its own training camps where members of the group 
memorized the Qur’an, trained in various sports and self-defense, performed collective 
prayers and listened to the preaching of their murshids, imbued with political messages. 
Such spaces were “micro-cosmic experiments in Islamist utopia, past and future. These 
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camps were meant to be a model of the future Islamic society,”251 which of course 
differed dramatically from the foundations of the state that Sadat was proclaiming.252  
 The discourse of the “victors” that celebrated the “civilian ‘ubur” and the socio-
economic accomplishments of the state and the nation under the wise guidance of the 
leader was meaningless for the Islamists. According to Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
the spiritual guide of al-Jihad, Sadat “instituted non-Islamic personal status laws, aided 
Zionists, constructed an ecumenical house of worship,...and avowed that there was no 
religion in politics and no politics in religion,”253 the state and its institutions, as the 
shaykh deemed, lost efficiency and legitimacy. Activists in the Islamic movement “saw 
the world as a society in crisis, moral and spiritual degradation,”254 therefore, the glorious 
military parades that cultivated the sense of progress, security and achievements were 
perceived as absurd. They coincided with military training in the Islamist camps, which 
“satisfied people’s need for inner security in the face of uncontrollable disaster.”255  
 Official government holidays with effect-oriented spectacles and Sadat playing 
the leading part, were celebrated in parallel with the traditional religious holidays 
organized by the jama‘at. A hundred thousand people assembled in front of the 
president’s ‘Abidin Palace in Cairo, wearing white jalabiyyas and black ‘abayas, and 
performed a public prayer. The choice of the place was not fortuitous: this prayer served 
as a reminder that the ruler had to govern according to the principles of justice and to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
251 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, 139. 
252 Such camps are described in Alaa al Aswany’s novel The Yacoubian Building.  
253 Jeffrey T. Kenney, Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 137. 
254 James Toth, “Islamism in Southern Egypt: a Case Study of a Radical Religious 
Movement,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35, no. 4, (2003): 551. 
255 Hinnebusch, 199. 
! '+!
“what God has revealed” (bi-ma anzala Allah).256 Such famous speakers as Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and Muhammad al-Ghazali honored the celebrations with their presence and 
their lectures.     
 In his essay Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field, Pierre Bourdieu argues: 
“The symbolic subversion of symbolic order can affect the political order only when it 
accompanies a political subversion of that order.”257 Indeed, with their meaning-making 
practices and texts, the radical Islamists impinged upon the authority of the “traditional” 
religious structures that legitimized and conserved political order. By giving new 
meanings to religious symbols and projecting them onto the current political arena they 
tried to create a counter-discourse that undermined the existing political order. They 
initiated and imposed their own schemas of perception of both political and religious 
realities on their constituency.  
 This chapter has demonstrated how semiotic practices that unfold in particular 
spaces and time convey meanings, tell stories, and evolve within a particular context, 
serving as a means of discourse formation and transformation.  
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 This work has analyzed the formation and transformation of the official political 
discourse in Egypt during Sadat’s era and explored the counter-narrative of the radical 
Islamist groups that flourished in the second half of the 1970s. It has shown how ideas 
emerge, take verbal forms and lead to political actions, and how socio-political structures 
can also produce discourses. The relationships between social structures and political 
agency expressed through language are complex and not self-evident. The correlations 
between political action and language are often imbued with contradictions. Nevertheless, 
an analysis of these relations can contribute to a better understanding of a particular 
political event and explain social action.    
 The research has illustrated how discourses compete for audiences and resources 
and often mirror each other despite the visible differences between them. Thus, the 
radical Islamist discourse in Egypt in many ways reflected the main themes, structure and 
the nature of the official narrative, but the presentation took a different form.  
 This paper contributes to the debate about authoritarianism and the use of 
language for political and ideological purposes. It has shown how opposition movements 
utilize language to challenge the dominant discourse of an authoritarian government. 
Language illustrates which values inform the political field and shape political culture in 
a country, for every discourse creates its audience and followers.   
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 The paper has demonstrated that discourse consists not only of written texts or 
intended and meaningful utterances, but also includes meaning-making practices that 
contribute to the formation and the development of a narrative. Semiotic practices 
become reservoirs of meanings and locuters of particular political messages. Words and 
actions that are repeated over time and are invested with meanings are powerful 
instruments for the construction of social realities. They create semantic fields and 
notions, construct norms and values, and address audiences. However, discourses are not 
infinitely powerful. Thus, in the case of Egypt, neither the official discourse nor the 
radical Islamist counter-narrative managed to dominate the political field and take hold: 
contrary to the expectations of the radical Islamists, their discourse did not produce a 
revolution once Sadat was assassinated, and the transition of power took place 
surprisingly smoothly. Sadat’s discourse and later his legacy were also marginalized after 
Hosni Mubarak took office. Rigidity and the exclusive and undemocratic nature of these 
discourses prevented them from producing a new reality or acting upon the existing one. 
Both of them used and abused words in order to promote their utopian projects, which 
were detached from the socio-historical realities of Egypt. In his discourse Sadat offered 
a civilizational model based on the principles of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and 
institutions, peace and developments. Inspired by Western conceptions, this discourse 
was transplanted in a rigidly regulated form into the “political soil” of Egypt. The 
modernizing but authoritarian state placed constraints on social debate around these new 
notions, and eventually the discourse failed together with its creator against the backdrop 
of socio-economic degradation. The radical Islamist discourse was based on seemingly 
familiar but rather vague notions that have waned and waxed in different periods of time  
("!
in the Islamic political thought. It also attempted to produce a symbolic socio-political 
order, which contested the one promoted by the official discourse. However, the counter-
discourse drew distinct frontiers between the followers and the “masses” and was 
antagonizing. The fixing of identity that the discourse demanded could lead to the 
dichotomous division of society into opposing camps, a society which had already been 
polarized by Sadat’s unsuccessful socio-economic policies. Hence, both discourses failed 
to create a hegemonic project that could cut across societal divisions and produce floating 
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